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Abstract
This thesis examines the law of insider trading in both the American and Egyptian legal
systems. It seeks to pinpoint the policy rationale behind prohibiting insider trading, the theories of
civil enforcement and criminalization, and the concept of tipping in the United States. It also analyzes
the express statutory prohibition under Egyptian law. Furthermore, it explains the doctrinal link
between securities fraud and insider trading in the U.S. as well as the enforcement mechanisms in
place at the SEC, the NYSE, and the NASDAQ. It also surveys the surveillance authority of the
Egyptian Financial Regularity Authority and of the Egyptian Stock Exchange. It concludes to that
both the American and Egyptian law prohibit the offense of insider trading and that there is an
effective enforcement mechanism in the United States. Yet, the Egyptian enforcement authorities still
need to adopt a clear and more efficient procedure for enforcing the offense of insider trading. The
Egyptian Financial Regularity Authority resources should be bolstered to recruit skilled personnel and
equip them with artificial intelligence technology.
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I.

Introduction

The Egyptian Stock Market is one of the earliest stock markets in history. The first stock
exchange in Egypt was the Alexandria Stock Exchange that was established in 1888. It was one of the
five most active stock markets in the world. Unfortunately, due to the adoption of communist ideas
after the 1953 revolution, market activities in Egypt radically diminished until 1992 when the Egyptian
Government switched and started applying pure capitalist principles. 1 Since then, the Egyptian Stock
Market has begun to recover. Egyptian Business Law Regulations adopted open market principles and
strove to attract foreign investment. They incorporated global trade customs and gave as many
incentives as they could, such as tax exemptions, simplifying foreign corporations’ registration and
free capital rehabilitation.
However, the Egyptian Stock Market has not completely recovered. The practices of
investment in corporate stock have never been as strong as they are in the United States. Americans
tend to invest heavily in the stock market, making it the backbone of the American commercial
system. 2 More than half of the American population owns stocks and actively trades in the stock
market. 3 On the other hand, a middle-class Egyptian citizen rarely invests in the stock market on
publicly held corporations. 4 It seems this is mainly because of the limited number of listed companies
in the Egyptian Stock Exchange, and not because of the lack of profitability of the investment.

Abdel Shahid, Does Ownership Structure Affect Firm Value? Evidence from the Egyptian Stock Market (2003),
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=378580.
2. Illegal insider trading: how widespread is the problem and is there adequate criminal enforcement? : hearing before the Committee on
the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Ninth Congress, second session, September 26, 2006.
3. Justin Mccarthy, Just Over Half of Americans Own Stocks, Matching Record Low, available at
https://news.gallup.com/poll/190883/half-americans-own-stocks-matching-record-low.aspx (last visited Dec. 23, 2018)
4. Egyptians usually invest in unreal economies, like the real estate market, and the resulting lack of stock investment
practices between Egyptians have had a tremendous drawback not just economically but also environmentally because
people usually direct their investment to real estate market and buy fertilized land and engage in soil dredging to
construct houses and sell the units with profit or just keep it and gamble for expected future high prices.
1. Shahira
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The price-earnings ratio in the Egyptian stock market is higher than the American ratio. 5
Partnership corporations and family-owned businesses are the most dominant forms of investment in
the Egyptian commercial system. A culture of investing in the stock market is crucial for a healthy
financial system. In order to recover the Egyptian financial system, the capital market regulatory
authority must seek means to increase the number of companies listed in stock exchanges and develop
a mechanism to raise public interest in investing in publicly traded companies.
In addition, market integrity is crucial for the robustness of active stock markets in any given
country. The investor needs a fair market and trustworthy insiders. Market integrity is built on two
main components: adequate disclosure and a fraud-free market. Stock market actors, such as directors,
officers, key employees (insiders), broker-dealers, investment banks, and outside counsel (temporary
insiders) play a crucial role in building market integrity. They have access to material, nonpublic
information about the company. If these actors trade or tip someone else to trade based on this
information, they can gain profits or avoid losses in a way that is not available to ordinary shareholders.
Misusing this nonpublic information negates market integrity and, for that reason, countries prohibit
the offense of insider trading.
As in American securities regulations, Egyptian securities regulations that prohibit securities
fraud are very broad. Yet, Egyptian law directly prohibits insider trading, but not on the basis of
common law fraud as in the American law. Egyptian securities regulations adopted different tools to
curtail insider trading. Some of these rules expressly prohibit trading on the basis of material,
nonpublic information, and others prohibit any fraudulent or manipulative acts that could influence
securities prices. Criminalization of insider trading under Egyptian law finds its basis in the Capital

5.

The total number of listed companies in Egyptian Exchange including Nilex are around 300 company. Egyptian
Exchange (EGX) - Listed Companies (Dec. 24, 2018, 11:29 AM), https://www.african-markets.com/en/stockmarkets/egx/listed-companies & Price/earnings Ratio in Egypt. CEIC (Dec. 24, 2018, 11:31 AM),
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/egypt/pe-ratio Price/earnings Ratio in the United States. S&P 500 PE Ratio
(Dec. 24, 2018, 11:33 AM), https://ycharts.com/companies/X/pe_ratio.
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Market Law (CML) No. 95 of 1992, which stipulates the penalty of imprisonment for a term not less
than two years and a fine of up to 20 million EGP, or twice the amount of gains realized, or the loss
avoided. 6 There are also different authorities who are empowered to enforce securities regulations.
The Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA) is the main surveillance authority over the stock market.
The CML empowers the chairman of the FRA with the right to prosecute any violation of its
regulations and the right to settle in any stage of a lawsuit. Article 21 of the CML gives the stock
exchange chairman the power to revoke transactions that are executed in violation of the CML or
other related securities provisions. 7 The Egyptian legal system also allows shareholders to bring private
actions through a direct complaint to the Attorney General’s office, which has the authority to
prosecute insider trading after the permission of the FRA chairman.
This research is intended to examine whether the Egyptian regulations that prohibit insider
trading are sufficient and if there is an adequate enforcement mechanism in place. It will address the
Egyptian regulations’ shortcomings and steps that can be taken to develop a robust framework where
necessary. The study will compare and contrast U.S. and Egyptian securities regulations to examine if
there are deficiencies in Egyptian securities regulations or its enforcement mechanism to prevent and
prohibit insider trading. In the introduction, we will define insider trading and the policy rationale
behind the prohibition. Chapter I will be assigned to give a description of insider trading under
American law in order to provide a reasonable background for the new reader. Chapter II will discuss
the enforcement mechanism in both the Egyptian and American legal systems.

Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya Adad 10 mokrer-h, March 14, 2018 (Egypt).
Article 21 of CML no. 95 for 1992 reads: (The chairman of stock exchange may suspend trading offers and bids
aiming price manipulation. He may revoke transactions which violate laws, provisions, regulations and decrees related to
their implementation, or which have been carried out with manipulated prices. He may also suspend the trading of a
given security in case its continuing transaction causes harm to the market or to participants in the market. The
Chairman of the Authority may take any of the preceding actions at due time).

6.
7.
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A.

Definition of Insider Trading
The term “insider trading” is a misnomer because insider trading applies to trade by persons

who are not necessarily insiders of the corporation issuer. Insider trading can also be committed by
“outsiders” who do not temporarily or permanently work or provide any services to the issuer. 8 Also,
the information that may form the basis for sale or purchase could be outside information as in case
of tender offers. 9 Further, insider trading may occur, theoretically, by canceling a contemplated trade
based on inside information. 10 However, Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with” element would not extend
to decisions to forego a planned security purchase or sale. Federal Securities Laws does not provide a
definition for insider trading and the term “insider trading” does not expressly exist in any legislation. 11
There was always reluctance when it came to codify a statutory definition for insider trading. Some
scholars believe this reluctance was due to political reasons. 12

8.

Outsider trading refers to securities transactions based on material nonpublic information by individual who are not
insider nor temporary insider of the issuer, the liability in these circumstances was not available before indorsing
misappropriation theory of insider trading on United Sates v. O’Hagan, 117 S.Ct. 2199(1997).
9. Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading - Part I: Regulation under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. Law. 223 p.224 (1985).
10 I agree with Senator Armstrong when he questioned Mr. Cox saying “Can you violate insider trading law by not
trading? In other words, suppose you are intending to trade and then come into possession of such information and
then don’t trade. Does that violate the law? He said no! But I don’t agree because avoiding the loss if he will buy over
valued stocks or gain profits by maintain stocks he was going to sell for undervalued price that’s advantage not available
for other shareholders” the subcommittee on securities of the senate banking House and Urban Affairs Committee June 19, 1987, U.S.
Government printing office Washington (1987). However, because the Rule 10b-5 stipulated that the actionable insider trading
act need to occur “in connection with” securities transaction not just by canceling a contemplated transaction, as
professor Manne believe (“A failure to sell cannot be violated of SEC Rule 10b-5, because there has been no securities
transaction.”) see, Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and Property Rights in New Information, 4 Cato J. 933, 938.
11. The preliminary note to §240.10b5-2 says “This section provides a non-exclusive definition of circumstances in which
a person has a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the “misappropriation” theory of insider trading under
Section 10(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-5. The law of insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial opinions” Cox&
Hillman& Langevoort, securities regulations, selected statutes, rules, and forms p.486, (2017).
12. Macey argue that there is one core side of the offense of insider trading is the political component, this side did not
receive an adequate treatment from securities scholars in compare with other cores like ethical and economic
perspective. This lack of scholarly writing addressing the political perspectives of insider trading seems to be unbeknown
in light of current political fight among SEC, the Congress and federal courts about who deserve to regulate insider
trading. Each party had his own interests to be the regulator and this could be clear if we reviewed their proposed
regulations. The fact that federal courts are the least of three battled parties could be politically influenced make them
able to articulate a reasonable treatment to insider trading. But this created a detest for SEC and Congress because of the
original legislation authority they empowered in terms of securities regulations and that leads to an intentional frustrate
for the principle that the United State Supreme court had established treating insider trading over the years. Macey,
"From Judicial Solutions to Political Solutions: The New, New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 39 AlA. L. REV. 355
(1988).
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Arnold Jacobs testified in his statement to the U.S. House Report, Energy and Commerce
Committee saying that, in order to enforce the broad anti-fraud provisions, a statutory definition was
not desirable and, if we did create a definition, “unscrupulous traders would skirt around any definition
constructed.” 13 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defended its “I know it when I see
it, but I can’t tell you what it is” 14 standard by saying, “the commission does not believe a statutory
definition is necessary for the continued success of its enforcement program.” 15 The SEC believes
that adopting a certain definition may impede its enforcement actions and prevent it from dealing with
new market trends. Furthermore, the SEC contends that the adoption of a definition will not increase
the sanctions that are allowed under securities anti-fraud provisions. These views are backed up by
the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association, who contend that this issue should be
left up to further judicial development, and that it is hard to come up with an exclusive definition that
can encompass Rule 10b-5 as it evolves. Then, if we do not have a definition for insider trading, how
may we describe a certain action as being insider trading?
Steinberg and Wang defined insider trading as “trading by anyone (inside or outside of the
issuer) on any type of material nonpublic information about the issuer or about the market for the
security.” 16 Hence, insider trading is a generic term that applies to anyone, whether it is an individual
or an entity, who lawfully or unlawfully obtains advantageous information—driven from inside the
issuer or from the market about the issuer securities—and trades based on this information. Whether
or not this trade constitutes trading “on the basis of material nonpublic information” will be
determined under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, thereunder.
However, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not address all frauds that may committed in the business,

U.S. House Report, Energy and Commerce Committee, Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 No. 98-355 at 13-14 (1983).
Id. p.3
15. Statement of Charles C. Cox Commissioner, securities and exchange commission before the subcommittee on
securities of the senate banking House and Urban Affairs Committee (June 19, 1987).
16. William Wang & Marc Steinberg, Insider Trading, 3rd ed., P.1 (2010).
13.
14.
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but only those “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” In other words, the fraud
must somehow “touch” upon securities transactions. 17

17.

Wang & Steinberg, supra, note 15, at p. 200.
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B.

Whether or not Insider Trading Prohibition is Justified.
Some securities scholars, as well as economists, have argued that trading on nonpublic

information may benefit stock market efficiency. We will survey the core views for those who believe
that insider trading should be legalized and follow that with counterarguments that refute that
assumption.

1. Insider trading should be legal:
The stock market dynamic, which may occur due to insiders’ transactions, led some
economists to concentrate their views on short-term economic benefits rather than the principles of
fairness. They stand for the legalization of insider trading, alleging that it is a reward for performance
and creates a new entrepreneurial role in the market.

1.1 Insider trading is a reward for performance:
Henry Manne believes that the attack on insider trading is, in fact, a war against free capital
markets. 18 He compares the insiders’ right to trade on their ideas and innovations with the patent
system, which secures an exclusive right for the inventor. He says insider trading promotes innovation.
Each smart employee is an entrepreneur, and his valuable ideas are his capital and should be put into
practice to profit. As capital increases its rate of return, ideas should be compensated. He continues
to say that, while corporations have other compensation tools, they are inadequate because they are
set in advance, and fair compensation should match individual contributions. Salary, special bonuses,
or stock options are not compensatory enough to meet the ambition, enthusiasm, and self-confidence

18.

Henry G Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, 44(6) Harvard Business Review 113 (1966).
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of employees and do not “serve the needs of the entrepreneur for the massive reward for great
innovations.” 19

1.2 Insider trading will add more players to the market:
Professor Manne also argues that insider trading allows any individual who works for a publicly
traded corporation to play an entrepreneurial role, which is an important advantage. Individuals can,
in effect, sell their own ideas without the necessity of having a large amount of capital available. This
also serves as an economic function that benefits the corporation; it will allow imaginative employees
to take risks and be less conservative.
Professor Manne’s thesis has been criticized through the years. Scholars responding to
Manne’s thesis contend that insider trading is an inadequate method for compensating corporate
managers. Initially, there are trading hedge rules for the stock market that limit risk. If we accept
Professor Manne’s thesis, then insiders hoping for massive personal profit will devalue any trading
rules, customs, and principles, and this could cause a disaster for the entire market. Easterbrook (1981)
further explained that permitting insider trading practices would increase the number of people
engaging in unreasonably risky business activities. He continued analyzing the inadequacy of presumed
managers and the rewards system saying that there is a difference between investors and managers in
terms of risk factors related to stock prices. Investors are free to invest in a portfolio to reduce risk,
which makes them less sensitive to stock price volatility. However, because managers do not have the
option to diversify, they are more sensitive to the volatility of stock prices. That leads us to the fact

19. Id.
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that “most managers would prefer the certainty of $100,000 salary to a salary of $50,000 and a 10
percent chance of a bonus of $500,000.” 20
Furthermore, permitting insider trading may become an incentive for managers to accept and
tolerate losses and negative developments instead of striving to overcome them because they can
benefit from bad news as well as good news. 21 Finally, business corporate managers’ positive
contributions and the developments they may bring to their corporations are closely examined and
appreciated by the entire financial system. Every smart manager, officer, or key employee whose
activities add value to their corporations, will be added to their employment history and big
corporations will fight to hire them no matter how expensive their salary, bonuses, stock options, or
other types of compensation are. 22 Hence, saying that insider trading is the best and most adequate
compensation method for corporate innovators is no longer plausible.

1.3 Insider trading contributes to market efficiency:
Carlton and Fischel argued that stock market efficiency is another reason to advocate for
insider trading. They argued that insider trading plays the same role as disseminated information in
terms of informing the shareholders and consequently influencing the price of stocks. They claim that
when an insider trades, the stock price will reflect this change as if the information has been disclosed.
The more disclosure for the identity of the insider, the closer the stock reflects its true price. 23 This
means corporations can control the stock price by controlling the communication of information
through insider trading.

Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, Sup. Ct. Rev. 309
p.332 (1981).
21. Haft, Robert J. "The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation." Michigan Law
Review 80, no. 5 (1982).
22. Broadcom paid its CEO Hock Tan a total compensation package of $103.2 million. See
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/09/how-much-the-5-highest-paid-ceos-earn.html.
23. U.S. brokerage firms nowadays publish corporation's insiders’ transactions as an indicator to inform investors about
stock's future price. See, https://robinhood.com/.
20.

17

The application of this theory is inapplicable because it assumes that insider trading is a
disclosure tool; it assumes that the corporation will utilize insider trading to tell the shareholder and
interested public that developments have occurred, so watch how the insiders trade and react
accordingly. Also, this assumes that insiders will always put their corporation’s interests before their
personal interests, and that is rare in humans. Besides, what if an insider’s transactions were fabricated,
intended only to manipulate the price, while there is no actual ground for price change? How would
we assess the accuracy of this disseminated information as we do with prospectuses or corporations’
periodic reports? Who will be liable in case of a violation, the insider who traded or the corporation?

2. Why insider Trading should be Prohibited?
Securities literature presents four main policy justifications for prohibiting insider trading:
fairness, market integrity, enhance prompt disclosure, and property protection.

2.1 Insider trading is not fair:
Insider trading is not fair because it harms the investor, the issuer, the bidder in cases of tender
offers or mergers, and market participants, such as broker-dealers. 24 Focusing our discussion over the
first person affected by insider trading, we will look from the stockholder’s side. The fairness approach
is based on the parity of information that should exist between two parties for any normal transaction.
However, information parity does not mean—as the SEC proposed—that transaction parties should
stand on the same level of knowledge, or “level playing field,” about the securities transactions. 25
Instead, fairness means there is no asymmetry of information access to the securities forgo prices

The trial court in Fridrich v. Bradford, held that the insider trader had breached a duty to the entire market, and set
damages representing the "losses" of all traders who had sold during the period from the insider's purchase until the
disclosure. Fridrich v. Bradford. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
25. “The law has no patience with plaintiffs who are foolish or overcautious. In Grant v. Attrill, 11 F. 469, 470
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882) ("The [plaintiff] seems to have preferred to sell rather than risk the management promised; and he
sold out"), see Paula J. Dalley, From Horse Trading to Insider Trading: The Historical Antecedents of the Insider Trading Debate, 39
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1289 (1998).
24.
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because of firm-specific information not because of general market conditions. 26 This means the issue
is not the information asymmetry itself but how the information is obtained; trading based on good
faith effort to understand the forego market prices is permitted, while trading based on stolen
information is prohibited. Professor William J. Carney investigated the causation of investor injury
because of insider trading. He concluded, “The loss of an investor is caused by the revelation of
truthful information, which he or she lacked at the time of trading, and which causes the market to
revalue the particular issuer's shares.” Whether the transaction was face-to-face or in person “investors
are directly solicited, the insider has in fact induced the other person to transact with him or her, and
causation is relatively clear.” 27 The trial court in Fridrich v. Bradford, applied this understand and held
that the insider trader had breached a duty to the entire market, and set damages representing the
“losses” of all traders who had sold their stocks during the period from the insider's purchase until
the disclosure. 28 The court in United States v. O’Hagan stated, “A misappropriator who trades on the
basis of material, nonpublic information, in short, gains his advantageous market position through
deception; he deceives the source of the information and simultaneously harms members of the
investing public.” 29
Besides, when insiders remain silent about material information pertaining to the transaction
of their corporation’s securities, they commit deception and cheat the shareholders, who have placed
their trust and confidence in them and expect them to speak. 30 Finally, saying that insider trading

26. William J. Carney, Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 863 (1987). See also, Chief Justice
Marshall notice in Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 195 (1817), if there is no superiority interims of information
accessibility "[i]t would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine within proper limits, where the means of
intelligence are equally accessible to both parties".

William J. Carney, Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 863 (1987). P. 864.
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
29. U.S. v. O’HAGAN 117 S.Ct. 2199 (1997).
30. Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1315 (2009).
27.
28.
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should be considered a reward for performance would open the door for fraud and affect market
efficiency.

2.2 Insider trading negatively affect market confidence:
The Supreme Court in United States v. O’Hagan used very clear language to warn against how
insider trading undermines investor confidence and impact negatively the entire economic system.
The court said, “Although informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely
would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic
information is unchecked by law.” The Supreme Court also emphasized that “if the market is thought
to be systematically populated with … transactors -trading on the basis of misappropriated
information- some investors will refrain from dealing altogether, and others will incur costs to avoid
dealing with such transactors or corruptly to overcome their unerodable informational advantages.’’ 31
Furthermore, from an economic view, if insiders were allowed to transact based on inside
knowledge, they would induce or prevent a securities transaction that was not going to be executed if
there was no insider trading. In the long run, these transactions will cause stock market flow to shift
from its economic normal format, and consequently widen the distance between the economic reality
of stocks and its trading prices. This fictitious shift will cause stock prices to be either underpriced or
overpriced and this will undermine market confidence.
Laura Beny conducted an empirical study on 33 countries, including highly developed and
newly emerging stock markets. The study proved that countries that had a robust prohibitive system
against insider trading enjoyed “ownership dispersion, stock price informativeness, and stock market
liquidity.” 32

O’Hagan 521 U.S. at 654.
Laura N. Beny, insider trading laws and stock markets around the world: an empirical contribution to the theoretical law and economics
debate, 32 J. Corp. L. 237 (2007).

31.
32.
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2.3 Prohibiting insider trading enhances prompt disclosure: 33
Disclosure plays a crucial role in building an efficient stock market. Market efficiency means
that stock information— both public and private—is fully reflected in its prices. The more efficient
markets can become, the more closely stocks’ intrinsic value is reflected in its prices. Corporations
used to make selective disclosures to certain securities market professionals. These practices prompted
the SEC to enact Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) to mandate public companies’ simultaneous
disclosures to the public when corporate officials first made selective disclosures to a privileged few.
This regulation applies to persons like brokers or dealers, investment advisers, personnel of an
investment company, any persons who owe a duty of trust or confidence, or any other associated
persons. Rule 100(b) of regulation FD allows disclosure to insiders or temporary insiders and exempts
them from selective disclosure prohibitions.
Express liability of insider trading will prompt, to a certain level, those who are potentially
liable to make timely public disclosure, so they avoid potential charges. Hence, the point is that if
insiders to the material nonpublic information cannot trade while business secrets exit, they will be
motivated to release information promptly and widely.

2.4 prohibiting insider trading enhance private property protection:
A corporation’s important nonpublic information is an intangible asset owned by the
corporation and, by extension, to all of its shareholders. Title transfer of valuable information or an
“intangible asset” or depleting it for the insiders’ private benefit is more or less a kind of property
theft. The rationale for assigning property rights to valuable information for the stockholder or the
corporation is the same as the rationale in prohibiting patent infringement. 34

33. See the argument that insider trading plays the same role as disseminated information and the counterargument we
presented in point 1.3 supra.
34 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52
S.M.U. L. Rev. 1589,1606-08 (1999).
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Corporations will only be incentivized to innovate and engage in strategic decisions if they can
capture the value of these investments without the fear of theft. Courts permit shareholders private
action for insiders trading in order to protect shareholders’ property interest in a corporation’s
nonpublic information. 35

II. The Offense of Insider Trading
A. Classical and Misappropriation Theories in American Federal Courts, Fraud
in Connection with the Purchase or Sale of Security Rule (10b-5).
Fraudulent nondisclosure was the earliest lawsuit shareholders brought in the United States
courts against corporate officers. 36 Although fraudulent conduct under common law requires an
affirmative misstatement and reliance to prove fraud, 37 courts have recognized that, in certain
circumstances, pure silence about material information could be sufficient to plead fraud. 38 One of
these circumstances is when there is a fiduciary relationship between the two parties to a transaction.
Courts, at this time, varied in evaluating these circumstances for what is called the “majority rule” and
“minority rule.” Under the majority rule, insiders owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation only, not to
the shareholders. This means insiders are free to use “material nonpublic information” in transactions

In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d 228, the court accepted the implied cause of action of insider trading and limited
the right of action to shareholders who had traded contemporaneously with the insider.
36. Donna M. Nagy, Richard W. Painter, and Margaret V. Sachs, Securities Litigation and Enforcement: Cases and Materials 4th
Edition, (2017).
37. Chief Justice Marshall stated in Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 195 (1817), parties to transactions have no
affirmative duty of disclosure.
38. Nagy, Painter, Sachs, Securities Litigation and Enforcement,supra, note 36, at 490.
35

22

with the corporation’s shareholders without any disclosure obligations. 39 Meanwhile, under the
“minority rule,” insiders are fiduciaries for both the corporation and the shareholders and thus,
insiders cannot remain silent about material nonpublic information. 40 Yet, under the minority rule,
there are still certain prerequisites for fiduciary obligation, like face-to-face transactions and transacting
with a party who had a pre-existing relationship with the corporation. In Goodwin v. Agassiz, 41 the court
said an insider trading violation would not exist if the identity of the insider was unknown to the buyer
(the shareholder) and there was no face-to-face transaction.
Before enacting the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act), courts used to adjudicate securities fraud disputes under Common Law and the
Criminal Code.
The United States Supreme Court shaped and endorsed Classical and Misappropriation theories
of insider trading in three cases: Chiarella v. United States 42 in 1980, Dirks v. SEC 43 in 1983, and United
States v. O’Hagan 44 in 1997. We will closely examine these three cases through the coming chapter.

1. The Classical Theory of Insider Trading
Traditional, special relationship or classical theory were the terms that courts used to refer to
the offense of insider trading when there was a relationship between the corporate insider and the
buyer or seller of securities of that corporation. In Dirks v. SEC, the Supreme Court referred to a

Bawden v. Taylor, 254 Ill. 464. The plaintiff was praying to set aside the stock sale under the Criminal Code, prohibiting
gambling in stocks, the court said, “officer of corporation is not a trustee for stockholders as respects their stock”.
Officers are trustees for the stockholders as a body not for an individual stockholder.
40. Dawson V Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 157 N.W. 929,938 (Iowa 1916).
41. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659,660 (Mass.1933).
43
. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222. Chiarella consider the source of the "classical" or "traditional" theory of insider
trading liability.
43. Dirks v. SEC 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
44. United Sates v. O’Hagan, 117 S.Ct. 2199(1997). Prior to O'Hagan, a majority of the Court had recognized Section 10(b)
and Rule l0b-5 liability for insider trading only under the classical theory. See Nagy, Donna M., "Reframing the
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O'Hagan Suggestion" (1998). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 615.
39.
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“special relationship” between the insider of the corporation and its shareholders. 45 This special
fiduciary relationship was the basis of the classical theory for insider trading.
The Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States defined the elements of insider trading under
classical theory, which defines who the insider is, to whom the insider owes the fiduciary duty, and
what the limits of their liabilities are.
The facts of Chiarella v. United States came as the petitioner, Vincent Chiarella, was employed
by a financial printer that had been engaged to print corporate takeover materials. Chiarella was able
to deduce the names of the target corporation before receiving the true names on final the printing
night. He purchased stock in the target companies and, after the takeover went public, he profited
from selling the purchased shares. After an SEC investigation, Chiarella entered into an agreement
with the SEC to return the profits he made to the sellers of the shares. Thereafter, he was indicted
and convicted for violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5—as the jury was instructed—because he
willfully failed to disclose to the sellers of the target company the inside information about the
forthcoming takeover bid.

1.1 The Supreme Court ruling on Chiarella:
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit conviction and ruled that Chiarella’s
conviction under Section 10(b) was improper because the liability under Section 10(b) is premised
upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust between parties to a transaction. Since
Chiarella was not insider did not owe the acquired corporation shareholders a duty to disclose, he also
was not a fiduciary for the sellers of the target corporation because they had not placed their trust in
him. The Supreme Court said Chiarella’s conviction could not be justified on the alternative theory

45.

Wang & Steinberg, supra, note 15, at 291 and thereafter.
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under Rule 10b-5 that he breached a fiduciary duty to the acquiring corporation to whom Chiarella
owed a duty of trust because such a theory was not presented to the jury.
The Supreme Court said there is no such evidence from the language or the legislative history
of Section 10(b) that can form such a broad disclosure duty between all participants in market
transactions based on the mere possession of material nonpublic information. Instead, there is a
detailed securities regulation that recognizes when such use of nonpublic information may not harm
the efficiency of the stock market. 46 Hence, classical theory liability requires a duty to disclose and
that this duty arises from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction. Since
the sellers of the target corporation stocks did not put their trust in Chiarella, the Supreme Court
reversed the indictment saying there was no “general duty between all participants in market
transaction to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information.” 47 However, insiders such as
officers and directors of the corporation whose stock is traded do owe such duties to the corporation’s
shareholders. The Court left open the possibility of Chiarella’s indictment under other theories
because they were not included in the jury instructions.
Justice BURGER dissented saying the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 which says
“Any person engaged in any fraudulent scheme” 48 would encompass any person who misappropriated
nonpublic information, and that person has an absolute duty to disclose or abstain from trading. It is
not only limited to corporate insiders.

1.2 Dirks v. SEC 49
In Dirks v. SEC, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the DC Court of Appeals insider trading
judgement against Dirks who was an officer of a New York broker-dealer firm specialized in analysis

46. Title 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. II) Williams act allows for a certain limit the bidder in tender offer to trade
on the target corporation before announcing the tender offer.
47. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 661.
48. O’Hagan 521 U.S. at 661.
49. Dirks 463 US. At
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of insurance companies’ securities. Ronald Secrist, a former officer of an insurance company
incentivized by verifying and exposing fraud, gave Dirks inside information about how overstated his
insurance company’s assets were. Based on Secrist’s information, Dirks started his own investigation
and during this stage of investigation, he openly discussed that information with a number of his
clients. Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded that insurance company’s stocks, but some of his
clients sold their stocks based on his tips before the stock price fell. The SEC charged Dirks with
securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, alleging that he aided and abetted his clients to
sell their stocks in the insurance company based on material, nonpublic information conveyed by
company insiders.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Chiarella v. United States and acknowledge its violation
elements 50 and added that Rule 10b-5 also requires a scheme of “manipulation or deception” to make
personal profits. 51

1.3 Elements of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s violation under classical theory
Chiarella v. United States set the precedent that violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by
corporate insiders requires a breach of a disclosure duty which is arising from a relationship of trust
and confidence. That requires first, the existence of a relationship affords access to inside information
intended to be available only for the corporation’s purposes. Second, the unfairness of allowing a
corporate insider—or a co-participant—to take advantage of that information by trading without
informing the victim.

1.4

Can silence constitute a manipulative or deceptive device?

50.

There is “two elements for establishing a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by corporate insiders which are the
existence of a relationship affords access to inside information intended to be available only for corporate purpose, and
the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure”.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
51. O’ Hagan, 521 U.S. at 657.
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Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require the use of a “deceptive device” in connection with a
securities transaction to charge for insider trading. At this point, can pure silence be sufficient to plead
securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, thereunder?
Neither the language of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 answers this question. Federal courts
emphasized the common law rule in Frigitemp Corp. v. Fin. Dynamics Fund, Inc. 52 which reads “[I]he party
charged with failing to disclose market information must be under a duty to disclose.” Thus, silence
in connection with securities transactions may operate as a fraud actionable under Section 10(b) when
there is a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between transaction
parties. 53 In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 54 the court held that a bank agent had a duty to inform
its mixed-blood Indian customers that their shares could be sold for a higher price on a non-Indian
market, which the customers were unaware of. This duty to inform arose from the trust the Indian
customers placed in the bank agent. Hence, silence may constitute a manipulative or deceptive device
when there is a relationship of reliance and trust.

1.5 Who is insider under classical theory:
The Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC indicates that liability under classical theory applies to not
only officers, directors, and other permanent insiders of the corporation but also to "temporary
insiders" or "quasi-insiders," such as attorneys, accountants, and investment bankers who become
temporary fiduciaries of the corporation. In Dirks the Supreme Court developed the idea of temporary
insiders saying “Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed
legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, these
outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is
not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have
52.

Frigitemp Corp v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 282 (CA2 1968).
Nagy, Painter, Sachs, Securities Litigation and Enforcement, supra, note 37, at 517.
54. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
53.
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entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are
given access to information solely for corporate purposes” 55
Further, the issuer itself might be included in the circle of classical theory and treated as an
insider, courts have treated corporations trading on the basis of inside information to benefit the
corporation itself as any person subject to the disclose or abstain rule. 56

1.6 Possession vs. Use
Under classical theory, liability requires that insider trading took place while “in possession
of” material, nonpublic information. The question is whether one had in one’s possession material,
nonpublic information in all occasions and must disclose or abstain from trading or if one is only
barred from using this information in trading? This is the question of Whether liability for insider
trading under Rule 10b-5 should be determined pursuant to a “knowing possession” test or a “use”
test. 57
In SEC v. Adler 58 and United States v. Smith 59 the two federal courts rejected the SEC possession
standard and ruled that Rule 10b-5 prohibited trading only on the basis of material, nonpublic
information. 60 This means if a person traded while in possession of material, nonpublic information,
the government would still need to prove that the person actually used the inside information in a
trading decision and not for any other reason.

Dirks 463 U.S. at 655. Footnote 14.
Wang & Steinberg, supra, note 15, at p. 303. See also Chiarella v. United States. The term "insider" is also used to
describe persons such as attorneys, and other professionals who work as temporary agents of the corporation
(sometimes termed "temporary insiders" or "quasi-insiders").
57. Nagy, Painter, Sachs, Securities Litigation and Enforcement, supra, note 37, at 546
58. SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325.
59. States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9 th Cir.1998).
60. The court summarized SEC position saying “The Commission also believes that Rule 10b–5 does not require a
showing that an insider sold his securities for the purpose of taking advantage of material nonpublic information.... If an
insider sells his securities while in possession of material adverse non-public information, such an insider is taking
advantage of his position to the detriment of the public.”
55.
56.
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However, in United States v. Teicher, 61 the Second Circuit reached the opposite ruling and
stipulated “a knowing possession” for three reasons. First, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require only
that a deceptive practice be conducted “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security” and “in
connection with” clause must be “construed flexibly to include deceptive practices ‘touching’ the sale
of securities.” Second, a “knowing possession” standard comports with the maxim that one with a
fiduciary or similar duty to hold material, nonpublic information in confidence must either “disclose
or abstain.” Finally, a “knowing possession” standard has the attribute of simplicity. It recognizes that
one who trades while knowingly possessing material, inside information has an informational
advantage over other traders. 62
The SEC did not wait for this conflict to be solved through case-by-case adjudication. The
SEC opted to use its authority under Section 10(b) to promulgate Rule 10b-5-1 to endorse a “knowing
possession” 63 with an affirmative defense in Rule 10b-5-1(c)(1)(i), which provides that a purchase or
sale is not “on the basis of” material, nonpublic information if there was a predetermined plan for the
sale or purchase of securities. This includes entering into a good faith, binding contract for the sale or
purchase of securities, instructing another person to transact on the account owner’s behalf, or
adopting a written plan for trading securities. 64

2. The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading
The misappropriation theory was introduced to protect the integrity of security markets from
outsiders who have access to a corporation’s secrets but owe no fiduciary duty to the corporation’s
shareholders.

United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir.1993)
Id.
63. Nagy, Painter, Sachs, Securities Litigation and Enforcement, supra, note 37, at 517.
64. See Rule 10b-5-1(c)(1) (i)
61.
62.
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According to the misappropriation theory, one commits insider trading securities fraud under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 when one, “in connection with” a
securities transaction, misappropriates confidential information in a breach of duty of loyalty and
confidentiality owed to the source 65of information who owns the exclusive use of that information.

2.1 United States v. O’Hagan 66
In United States v. O’Hagan, the United States Supreme Court was confronted with similar facts
as in Chiarella v. United States, but in O’Hagan, the court was not restricted by limited jury instructions.
James O’Hagan was a partner in the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney that was hired to represent
Grand Metropolitan PLC on a potential tender offer. While Dorsey & Whitney law firm was still
retained to represent Grand Metropolitan, O’Hagan started purchasing call options for the target
company stocks. When the tender offer was publicly announced, O’Hagan sold his stock for a profit
of $4.3 million. The SEC charged O’Hagan, inter alia, for misappropriating material, nonpublic
information for personal benefit and defrauding Grand Metropolitan PLC and the Dorsey & Whitney
law firm who was working for the bidder. The indictment charged O’Hagan with the violation of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5for fraudulent trading in connection with a tender offer in violation of
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 14e-3(a). O’Hagan was convicted and sentenced to
prison.
The Eighth Circuit reversed O’Hagan’s conviction, holding that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5 liability may not be grounded on the misappropriation theory. Further, the Eighth Circuit said
misappropriation theory is inconsistent with Section 10(b) and under Chiarella and Dirks ruling “only

65.

Professor Nagy suggests a broader 'fraud on investors" version of the misappropriation theory, she says investors in
the marketplace are also deceived and defrauded when a person purchases or sells securities based on material,
nonpublic information that has been misappropriated from the information's source. See Nagy, Donna M., "Reframing the
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O'Hagan Suggestion" (1998). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 615.
P.1223.
66. U.S. v. O’Hagan, 117 S.Ct. 2199 (1997).
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a breach of a duty to parties to a securities transaction, or, at the most, to other market participants
such as investors, is sufficient to give rise to Section 10(b) liability.” 67
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded Eighth Circuit and ruled that a
person who trades in securities for personal profit, using confidential information misappropriated in
breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the information, will be found guilty of violating Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The United States Supreme Court said Eighth Circuit erred in holding that the
misappropriation theory is inconsistent with Section 10(b) because the deceptive nondisclosure is
essential to Section 10(b) liability under the theory. Hence, O’Hagan failure to disclose his personal
trading to Grand Met and Dorsey while he is required to speak that made his conduct “deceptive”
under Section 10(b).
The Supreme Court further explained that “In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary
relationship between company insider and purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the
misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who
entrusted him with access to confidential information.” 68 The misappropriation theory bars only
“trading on the basis of information that the wrongdoer converted to his own use in violation of some
fiduciary, contractual, or similar obligation to the owner or rightful possessor of the information.” 69

2.2 Elements of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s violation under misappropriation
theory.
The Supreme Court in O’Hagan emphasized three elements, deceptive conduct of material
nonpublic information, in connection with a securities transaction, and scienter and willfulness in
criminal action. The Court affirmed and endorsed the criminal liability under Section 10(b) on the
misappropriation theory. The court held that liability under misappropriation theory meant that a
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 661.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
69. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665.
67.
68.
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Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violation occurred when an outsider traded based on nonpublic,
confidential information in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information, rather
than to the person with whom he traded. O’Hagan emphasized that section 10(b) liability requires
deceptive conduct of material nonpublic information, in connection with a securities transaction, and
scienter. 70

i.

First element: Deceptive conduct
The Supreme Court defined deception as “[a] fiduciary who pretends loyalty to the principal

while secretly converting the principal’s information for personal gain dupes or defrauds the
principal.” 71 So, if the fiduciary informed the source of information that he planned to trade based on
secret information he had, there is no deceptive device and, consequently, the liability under
misappropriation theory will be foreclosed because there is no “deceptive device”.

ii.

Second element: In connection with the purchase or sale of security
The misappropriation’s deceptive use must be “in connection with the purchase or sale of

security,” which means that information had to be used in purchasing or selling securities and not for
any other uses. In SEC v. Clark, 72 the court said Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not proscribe all
frauds occurring in the business world, only those “in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.”

iii.

Third element: Scienter and willfulness in criminal action

70.

In Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455. Investors brought putative class action against
corporation and individual officers and directors alleging securities fraud. The court enumerate six elements of an
implied § 10(b) cause of action for securities fraud are (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2)
scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance
upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.
71. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 642.
72. Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1990)
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Scienter is a required element in every case involving fraud, that’s esteems from the common
law and rule 10b-5 adopts that element whether the SEC or U.S. attorney brings the insider trading
case. However, in prosecuting insider trading criminally proving willfulness conduct is required in
addition to scienter. The United States Supreme Court defined Scienter in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.” 73
The Supreme Court in O’Hagan concluded that misappropriation theory was consistent with
the statute and precedent and establishing criminal violation of Rule 10b-5 under the misappropriation
theory would require proving the presence of culpable intent (scienter), which means that the
defendant “willfully,” and with knowledge of Rule 10b-5, committed the violation. The defendant will
not be imprisoned if he can prove his lack of knowledge of the rule.
Hence, the scienter element is necessary to prove violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Negligence will not suffice to constitute a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5; however, actual
intent will satisfy this element. The overwhelming majority of the circuit courts have concluded that
recklessness is also enough in non-criminal cases. 74 Some courts have established a three elements
formula for scienter of an insider trading case. The three elements are actual knowledge of nonpublic,
material information, knowledge that the information was undisclosed, and knowledge that the
information was material. 75 If the liability of insider trading was based on the misappropriation theory,
the tippee must also know that the tipper disclosed the inside, nonpublic information on a breach of
fiduciary duty to the source of information. 76

73.

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185. P159.
Wang & Steinberg, supra, note 15, at p. 42.
75. Id. & see SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47.
76. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 673- 78.
74.
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B. The Concept of Tipping Under Dirks v. SEC 77 (1983) and Salman v. United

States 78(2016) 79
Tipping occurs when an insider passes on information that he knows is material and nonpublic to
an outsider, in violation of a fiduciary duty to the issuer or the source of the information. 80 The United
States Supreme Court established a test for securities fraud responsibility of the person who receives
material, nonpublic information in Dirks and reaffirmed this test in Salman v. United States. We are
going to define the concept of tipping and the element of personal benefits.

1. Tipping under Dirks v. SEC (1983)

77.

Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420
79 We did not discuss tipping as a classical theory problem and misappropriation problem separately. When the tipper
violates a fiduciary duty to the issuer this will be a classical theory of insider trading, and when the tipper violates a duty
to the source of information that will be misappropriation theory. Many times, the two theories come together because
when a tipper violate a fiduciary duty to the issuer, the issuer is also the source of information.
80. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156
78.
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The United States Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC extended the liability of insider trading to
the temporary employee or agent of the corporation and to persons “called tippees” and made them
obliged under the disclose or abstain rule. 81 A tippee is a person who receives information from the
“tipper” in breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders. The court made it clear that if a tippee trades on
nonpublic information received from an insider or someone who, in turn, received it from an insider
“tipper,” and the “tippee” knows that the information was disclosed in violation of the tipper’s
fiduciary duty, he might be found liable for committing insider trading under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. The Court defined tippees as “those individuals who trade securities of a company while in
possession of material, nonpublic information about that company (a “tip”) that was conveyed by a
corporate insider in violation of his fiduciary duty to the company’s shareholders.” 82 That means the
tippee, by obtaining the tip, will inherit a derivative obligation of fiduciary duty to the company’s
shareholders from the tipper, and that obligation requires the tippee to adhere to the disclose or
abstain rule, same as the insider. The question before the Supreme Court was whether or not Dirks,
as a tippee, violated anti-fraud laws by disclosing the material information he received from the tipper
to his clients.
The Court set an objective criterion in Dirks saying “the tippee” would be held liable under
the disclose or abstain rule if the “tip” breached a fiduciary duty and that breach occurred for the sake
of personal benefits. Since the insurance company former insider (the tipper) did not breach his
fiduciary duty to the company’s shareholders by providing insider information to the tippee, the tippee
does not inherit the duty to disclose or abstain and there is no derivative breach.

81. Nagy, Donna M., "Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles" (2009). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper
34
82. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 19
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The Court said that determining if a disclosure is a breach of duty depends, in large part, on
the purpose of the disclosure, which means scienter is an independent element of a Rule 10b-5
violation under classical theory.
The Court said not all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction
come within the ambit of Rule 10b–5. The tipper may disclose inside information, but still act
consistently with his fiduciary duty. For instance, if the tipper does not anticipate that the tippee will
trade on the basis of disclosed information or the tipper does not recognize that the tip is material and
may constitute nonpublic information.
So, the manipulation or deception element is required to constitute unfairness when the insider
takes advantage of information intended to be available only for a corporation’s purposes. The tippee’s
responsibility must be related back to the insider’s responsibility by showing that the tippee knew that
the information was given to him in breach of a fiduciary duty to the stockholder (under classical
theory) or to the source of information (under misappropriation theory).
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain, it is necessary
to determine whether the insider’s “tip” constitutes a breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty. 83
Dirks adopted -but read it differently than SEC- the Cady, Roberts 84 formulation of the breach
of duty in which the transmission of information that was made available only for a corporate purpose
for personal benefits, with the intent and knowledge that the individual is going to trade.
The Dirks’ court also emphasized the Chiarella ruling saying that there can be no duty to
disclose where the person who has traded on inside information “was not [the corporation’s]
agent...was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed

83.

O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 669.
IN THE MATTER OF CADY, ROBERTS & CO. Cady & Roberts & Co., Re, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) in this case the
court held that the defendant tippees did not violate any fiduciary duties concerning stock purchases where the SEC
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their trust and confidence.” 85 This does not mean the tippee is free to trade. The tippee might inherit
the tipper’s liability if the tip was in breach of the tipper’s fiduciary liability. Since the tip does not
breach the former insider fiduciary obligation to the insurance company, petitioner -Dirks- who
received the material, nonpublic information from “insider” of a corporation with which he had no
connection, does not inherit the insider liability. Besides, the tipper was motivated by a desire to expose
fraud, received no monetary or personal benefit from revealing the information, and their purpose to
make a gift of valuable information to the petitioner. Thus, there was no actionable violation of antifraud provisions of federal securities laws resulting from the petitioner’s disclosure to his clients who
relied on it in trading shares of the corporation.

2. Why the Supreme Court vacated court of appeal Dirks finding of illegal insider
trading:
First, from Ronald Secrist’s (the tipper’s) side, there was no culpability in sharing the nonpublic
information with Dirks because the tipper believed that the information was transmitted for a proper
purpose (exposing the company fraud) and he did not receive or expect to receive a direct or indirect
personal benefit from his disclosure.
Second, from Dirks’ side, initially he did not owe the company stockholders a fiduciary duty
and there is no fiduciary duty breach to be inherited from the insider. Besides, the manipulative and
deceptive element were not clear from Dirks’ actions, it seems that the court interpreted Dirks’
disclosure to some of his clients as incidental in his main purpose of striving to expose fraudulent
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corporate practices. That means there is no scienter, which is necessary to prove the violation of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.

3. Personal Benefits Test under Dirks
The United State Supreme Court used the language of personal benefits, personal gains, or
personal advantage to hold the tipper liable of insider trading and, consequently, the derivative
responsibility of the tippee. In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or
abstain from using nonpublic, material information received from an insider, the Court said it depends
on whether the insider himself has breached his Cady, Roberts duty to shareholders in disclosing the
nonpublic information to the tippee. Since the insider did not personally benefit, directly or indirectly,
from his disclosure, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders and, consequently, there is no
tippee derivative breach. 86 Thus, the Dirks test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly
or indirectly, from his disclosure.

4. Tipping under Salman v. United States (2016)
Salman v. United States was the fourth Supreme Court insider trading case after Chiarella, Dirks,
and O’Hagan. The Supreme Court endorsed and outlined classical theory of insider trading in Chiarella.
In Dirks, the Supreme Court extended insider trading liability to the tippee and set a test for the
personal benefit element. Finally, in O’Hagan, the Court endorsed misappropriation of insider trading.
In Salman v. United States, the source of information was Maher Kara, a former investment
banker at Citigroup. Maher shared inside information with his brother, Michael Kara, who, in turn,
shared this information with his friend and relative-by-marriage, Salman. Michael told Salman that the
source of information was his brother, Maher. Salman was indicted for federal securities fraud crimes
for trading on inside information. Maher testified at Salman’s trial that he shared inside information
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with his brother, Michael, to benefit him and expected him to trade on it. Michael testified to sharing
that information with Salman, who knew that it was from Maher. The main issue in the Salman case is
that Maher, the initial tipper, did not receive any pecuniary benefits from his tips as the Dirks test
requires.

5. In Salman v. United States , the Supreme Court abrogated Second Circuit ruling
The Supreme Court in Salman v. United States did not follow the minority ruling set by the
Second Circuit in United States v. Newman, 87 and reaffirmed Dirks and rules that Maher breached his
duty of trust and confidence to Citigroup and its clients, he was under the duty of trust and confidence
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and he shall not tip inside corporate information to others who he
knows will trade on his tips. Further, Maher personally benefited by making a gift of inside corporate
information to his brother. The facts even stated that Maher asked his brother Michael why he needed
the information. Michael answered I owe someone money. The Supreme Court read this is quid pro

In United States v. Newman, the Second Circuit held that a “gift” of inside information could not be sufficient to plead
insider trading unless there is ‘‘proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship’’ between tipper and tippee ‘that
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly
valuable nature. See, Nicole Vanatko, The Latest Chapter in Insider Trading Law: Major Circuit Decision Expands Scope of
Liability for Trading on a “Tip”, Congressional Research Service (2017).
87.
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quo of the gift. Michael substituted money and turned down Maher’s money offer, preferring the
information. 88 The Court found this a sufficient personal benefit for the tipper, and his advantage was
that he was able to give a gift with someone else’s property, so the tip saved him money. Farther
Salman committed securities fraud by trading on an insider tip in disregard of his knowledge that the
tipper’s tip violated his fiduciary duty under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
The Court also rules that scienter and willfulness from the tipper’s side exist when he beliefs,
anticipation, knowledge, or understanding that the tippee will trade based on the inside information.

1. Can a gift suffice the personal gains test?
Dirks answered, yes. “The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic
information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or
friend.” 89 Dirks’ language is extremely specific in determining when it would be proper to convict for
insider trading when an insider makes a gift of confidential information. Tippers do not have to receive
a monetary or tangible personal benefit, it does not have to be quid pro quo from the tippee to the
tipper, but it will be sufficient when the tipper makes a gift to the tippee and, in particular, a relative
or friend. However, the personal benefit element does not include accidentally or unwillingly
transferring information and, in this circumstance, the tippee might be liable if the other elements of
the violation exist.
Final thoughts in understanding insider trading and the legal justification of prohibition

89. Dirks id. The petitioner lawyer defended this understanding saying these are dictum and the holding is far different
and dictum shall not be used to be the basis for criminal liability, the supreme court justice responded on the bench and
said “But it is not a dictum when it says thus the test is whether the insider personally will benefit directly or indirectly
from his disclosure”
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The main difference between insider trading liability under classical and misappropriation
theory is that “The two theories are complementary, each addressing efforts to capitalize on nonpublic
information through the purchase or sale of securities. The classical theory targets a corporate insider’s
breach of duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts; the misappropriation theory outlaws
trading on the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate ‘‘outsider’’ in breach of a duty owed not
to a trading party, but to the source of the information.” 90
In other words “The offense in classical theory is on the person who transacted with the insider, while
in misappropriation theory the offense is on the source of the material nonpublic information.” 91
If banning insider trading will increase market efficiency and there is a public interest in attaining
efficiency of securities markets, it becomes a public interest issue. Protecting that public interest from
violation makes the violation a public-order crime, which can be defined as a “crime which involves
acts that interfere with the operations of society and the ability of people to function efficiently.” 92
There is no doubt that the stock market nowadays is the backbone of the financial systems of many
countries, including the United States. If there is any interference with the soundness of the operation
of that market, the entire society will be affected, even for those who did not own securities. 93 Hence,
insider trading should be prohibited because it is a public-order crime.

O’Hagan 521 U.S. at 653
Donna Nagy, Securities Regulations Class Spring 2018, Maurer School of Law, Indiana University. & O’Hagan 521 U.S. at
642 said "Under the ‘‘traditional’’ or ‘‘classical theory’’ of insider trading liability, a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5
occurs when a corporate insider trades in his corporation’s securities on the basis of material, confidential information
he has obtained by reason of his position. Such trading qualifies as a ‘‘deceptive device’’ because there is a relationship of
trust and confidence between the corporation’s shareholders and the insider... ‘‘misappropriation theory’’ urged by the
Government here, a corporate ‘‘outsider’’ violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 when he misappropriates confidential
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information, rather
than to the persons with whom he trades."
92. Siegel, Larry J. (2006). Criminology: Theories, Patterns, & Typologies, 9th edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.
93. See J. William Hicks, International Dimensions of U.S. Securities Law (2018) (“There is a public interest in national property
resources so the long-term financial security of its important resources, also has interest in capital availability which
secure flow of new capital into private enterprise, and public has interest in economic health 1929 and 1987 market crash
proved that there is a relationship between securities market and the nation as a whole”.
90
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Rule14e-3 is a specific insider trading rule adopted by the SEC that only applies in the context
of tender offer and this paper does not discuss that specific insider trading Rule. 94

C. Criminalization under Egyptian Capital Market Law, Express Statutory
Prohibition Not Defined as Fraud.
1. Background on the Egyptian legal system and its stock market:
Islamic law and Napoleonic Code, which in turn derived its principles from Islamic law, 95
formed the origins of the Egyptian legal system. 96 Egypt is a civil law country, which means a court’s
ruling is built on codes and administrative orders, not on case law as in the United States. However,
previous judicial decisions of higher courts do have persuasive authority, 97 especially when the laws

For a detailed analysis for Rule14e-3 See Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers,
67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 421 (2000).
94.

See « La Civilisation des arabes et l’étude scientifique de l’histoire », Revue Scientifique, 1er décembre 1883. It says that when
Napoleon Bonaparte was in Egypt, he took a book for the Islamic Mālikī school and developed his “Napoleonic Code”
on the basis of that Islamic school jurisprudence.
96. Ahmed Y. Zohny, Suitability of US Security Laws and Regulations to Serve as a Model Law for Egyptian Financial Markets, 15
Arab L.Q. 5 (2000).
97
. For more details about Egyptian law, Court System, and government branches see Mohamed S. E. Abdel Wahab, An
Overview of the Egyptian Legal System and Legal Research, GlobaLeX, (2012) available at
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Egypt1.html. And for more details about Egyptian laws affecting economic
activity see, Radwa S. Elsaman, Doing Business in Egypt After the January Revolution: Capital Market and Investment Laws, 11 Rich.
J. Global L. & Bus. 43 (2011), Available at http://scholarship.richmond.edu/global/vol11/iss1/3.
95.
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governing the dispute at hand are elastic. The most related securities law in the Egyptian legal system
are: Companies Law No. 159 of 1981, the Capital Market Law No. 95 of 1992 and its Executive
Regulation, the Law of Non-Banking Financial Markets No. 10 of 2009, Central Depository Law No.
93 of 2000, related executive orders of the chairman of Egyptian Stock Exchange, and related orders
of the chairman of Financial Regulatory Authority. Article 27 of Capital Market Law (CML) 95 of
1992 allows for the establishment of Egyptian and foreign securities companies conducting one or
more of the following activities: 98
(1) Underwriting of subscriptions;
(2) Participation in the establishment of companies issuing securities;
(3) Venture capital;
(4) Clearing and settling of securities;
(5) Forming and managing securities portfolios and mutual funds;
(6) Acting as brokerage firms;
(7) Securitization; and
(8) Direct investment including hedge fund. 99

Under Egyptian securities regulations there are civil, administrative, and criminal sanctions for
securities fraud, and several entities are authorized to enforce these sanctions. Law No. 120 for 2008
established “Economic Courts” as a special court to quickly resolve business disputes and to guarantee
adjudicating this kind of case through an experienced judge.
In order to unify the supervisory authority over the entire Egyptian non-banking financial
markets, Article 3 of law No.10 of 2009 replaced the Capital Market Authority by Financial Regulatory
Authority (FRA) 100 to be in charge of enforcing the provisions of CML 95 of 1992. The FRA is an
Law No. 95 of 1992 (L aw of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya Adad 10 mokrer-h, March 14, 2018 (Egypt).
Added by the order of the Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation no. 113 for 2018, item 4 of the
order regulates hedge fund saying, “direct investment company may add up the hedge fund activities to its purposes.”
100. we may also refer to FRA by Egyptian Financial Supervision Authority (EFSA) see
http://www.fra.gov.eg/content/efsa_en/efsa_pages_en/efsa_clarification_en.htm.
98.
99.

43

independent surveillance authority over the Egyptian stock market. Under Rule 902(b) of the
Securities Act of 1933, Egyptian Exchange (EGX) is an offshore securities market. 101
The Capital Markets Law No.95 of 1992 and its Executive Regulation did not define explicitly
what constitutes a security. At this point, Egyptian commercial law or any related law will be applicable
to define what constitute securities. Some argue that declining to define securities is a wise and
pragmatic approach taken by the Egyptian legislator to expand the coverage of securities for its
growing market. 102
Egyptian legislature appeals to the principles of honesty, which is very much drawn from
Islamic law and describes activities which are not in conformity with principles of honesty. 103
Article 63 of the CLM provides a wide anti-fraud provision to criminalize any activities that might
affect the integrity and efficiency of the Egyptian stock market. It criminalizes practicing any activity
of the capital market without being licensed or going beyond the scope of the license, public offering
of any securities in violation of the CML, misstatement or omission of material information either
when dealing with government officials or the trading public, and listing securities in stock exchange
in violation of stock market regulations.
Article 17 of the CML stipulated that listed securities must be traded on the stock exchange
and any sale that occurred outside of it would be deemed void.
The Executive Regulation of the CML stipulated that securities transactions on the stock
exchange must be executed through a brokerage firm. Article 89 of the CML executive regulation
enumerates the conditions that should be satisfied on any broker which includes a good reputation
and never been convicted in a crime negates his honor or integrity. The executive regulation also
established a responsibility for the Egyptian Exchange to oversee its employees and to report any

See the SEC letter at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/cairo041603.htm.
Ahmed Y. Zohny, supra.
103. Id.
101.
102.
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violations to the FSA. Article 90 thereafter explained the brokerage firm duties from the moment he
receives the customer’s order and prohibited any action that may cause damage to transacted persons
or execute a transaction for its own account. 104
Toward a new financial reform plan, on February 2018, the Egyptian Parliament approved
Capital Market Law (CML) amendments. The Amendments establish a legislative framework for the
Sukuk market in Egypt, create an exchange for trading in derivatives, including futures, options, and
swaps, and expand the scope of criminal violations under the CML. The Egyptian capital market
became more active because of the overall increased attractiveness of investment in Egypt after
floating the Egyptian pound in November 2016, and there are many relatively big Initial Public
Offerings (IPOs) going on. 105 World Bank report for 2018 referred to positive developments in the
Egyptian market. For instance, Egypt strengthened minority investors protections by increasing
corporate transparency, improving one-stop shopping, and making it easier to start a new business. 106

2. Statutory Prohibition of Insider Trading Under Egyptian Law:
In comparison to the United States, Egyptian insider trading law has enough fact a parity of
information prohibition similar to what was the system in the United States prior to 1980 when the
Supreme Court decided Chiarella. That means Egyptian law currently adopts the Second Circuit ruling
in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 107 of a broad prohibition that bars any person in possession of material
nonpublic information from trading or tipping.

104. Minister of Economics and Foreign Trade Decree No. 135 of 1993 (Executive Regulations of the Capital Market
Law), Al Jarida’ al-Rasmiyya, 8 Apr. 1993, vol.81 F. no. 8 (Egypt).
105. Al Tamimi & Company Equity Capital Markets in Egypt 2018 available at
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=07fb3eaa-db1f-45ac-b050-193888f847a6.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank, Doing Business 2019, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB2019-report_webversion.pdf
107 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (1968). The United States Supreme Court in Chiarella refused the Second
Circuit ruling and emphasized that there is no express disclose or abstain obligation it all goes to the fiduciary duty.
106.
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Article 64 of the Egyptian CML stipulates that I am translating it from the Arabic; (Without
prejudice to any heavier penalty stipulated in any other law; imprisonment for a term not less than two
years and a fine of not less than Fifty Thousand Egyptian Pounds (LE.50,000) or the amount of
realized gains or avoided loss and not exceed Twenty Million (LE. 20,000,000) or the greater of twice
the amount of realized gains or the avoided loss, or either penalty shall be inflicted on whomsoever
divulges inside information received by virtue of his duties according to the provisions of this law, or
benefits whether himself, his spouse, or his children, or inserts material misstatement in his official
reports, or disregards any material information, to the extent that it affects the results of such reports,
or trade on securities in violation of the provisions of Article No. 20 (Mokrer) 108 of this law.) 109
In turn, Article No. 20 (Mokrer) of the CML added by Law No. 123 for 2008 states, “It shall
be prohibited for any person who have on his position material nonpublic information which could
impact the status of any listed company to trade on its stock before this information became public,
and it is also prohibited to tip or disclose this nonpublic information to any person directly or
indirectly, the Executive Regulation of this law and stock exchange listing regulations shall determine
what constitute a material nonpublic information.” 110
Article 319 of the Executive Regulation defined what might constitute material information,
inside information, insiders, and insider trading as follows: 111
B) Material information: A single piece or set of information that might have actual impact on listed
stocks prices, had actual impact on investment decisions of investors, or had an effect on market
transactions of stocks. Material information becomes public information once it is equally accessible
to the trading public, in light of stock exchange disclosing rules.

108.

(Mokrer) is an Arabic term means bis, reiterated, or repeated.
Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya Adad 10 mokrer-h, March 14, 2018 (Egypt).
110. Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya Adad 23 mokrer-A, June 9, 2008 (Egypt).
111. Executive Regulations of Law No. 95 of 1992, added by the minster of Investment order no. 141 for 2006.
109.
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C) Inside information: Any material, nonpublic information about listed companies’ activities or one
of its related entities.
D) Insider: Any person who has access to information about the company or its issued securities, by
virtue of which he can benefit from it himself or through someone else, whether this access to
information has been done legally, or illegally, and whether he himself has accessed this information,
or it has come to his knowledge through someone else in one way or another, directly or indirectly.
Benefiting from inside information is subject to the crimination of Article (64) of the CML.
H) Insider trading: Where any person who has directly or indirectly benefited himself or someone
else from trading or using inside information, and the beneficiary of the inside information will be
considered/deemed to have benefited from inside information in accordance with the statutory
prohibition of Article (64) of the CML.
According to Article 324 “It shall not be considered insider trader whoever trade on securities
because of any reason not connected directly or indirectly to the inside information.”

3. Examining insider trading statutory prohibition under Egyptian law:
The first chapter made it crystal clear that the U.S. system of law defines illegal insider trading
as a fraud. However, in Egypt, we have criminal insider trading. It is market abuse and the Egyptian
CML explicitly criminalize insider trading and the law provide the criminal authority to prosecute
insider trading. 112
In examining the above series of provisions, we will see that Article 64 of the CML sets
sanctions for stock market violations that might be committed by governmental officials or any
persons (permanently or temporarily) hired to provide services for the issuing corporation who, by
“virtue of his duties,” know nonpublic information. Article 64 in its first part, prohibited disclosing
112.

What distinguishes fraud-based illegality from criminal prohibition is that in fraud there are elements like a material
non-disclosure in the face of an affirmative duty to disclose and reliance. While in criminal prohibition, the law explicitly
prohibits and define the prosecution authority.
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corporate inside information for any reason and not just for trading purposes, as if the disclosure
made to benefit the issuer’s competitive in a certain market. However, the last sentence of Article 64
says “or traded on securities in violation of the provisions of Article No. 20 (Mokrer) of this law.” This
part of prohibiting insider trading might not encompass all insider trading violations because the
language suggests that it is meant to address stock exchange officilas, Financial Regulatory Authority,
rating companies, or any person empowered by stock market law to have access to a corporation’s
nonpublic information. In other words, Article 64 proposes to incriminate officials and temporary
insiders for insider trading. Yet, it does not expressly prohibit insider trading that might be committed
by any person who is not an government official nor a permanent or temporary insider.
So, the question is would someone like Chiarella or O’Hagan that is not an insider of the
company whose securities had been traded on bases of nonpublic information, do they fall within
article 64? It seems no because they were hired to provide services for the issuing corporation. In
O’Hagan Case Pillsbury was the issuing corporation but O’Hagan law firm worked for Grand
Metropolitan. In application to the Egyptian law, O’Hagan would not be will not be covered under
Article 64 of the Egyptian CML executive regulation, but he would be liable under Article 20 which
seems broader.
This legislation gap might be completed by Article No. 20 (Mokrer) of the CML because it
used the term “any person.” Yet, the language does not properly address the offence of insider trading
because the legislator improperly inserted terms to define materiality of information and to show
causation of prohibition. It says “… any person who has a material nonpublic information which
could impact the status of any listed company to trade on its stock before this information became
public…” Using the phrase “impact the status of any listed company” suggests that the cause of
prohibition is not to disadvantage the listed corporation, and that might be interpreted to mean that
if the corporation is not itself injured, insider trading is not prohibited. However, Article No. 20
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(Mokrer) clearly prohibited tipping inside information, and also made a reference to the Executive
Regulation of the CML to define materiality of information.

4. Prohibition of insider trading on the Executive Regulation of the CML
Article 319 of the Executive Regulation of the CML adequately addressed insider trading, it is
a broad parity of information rule. 113 It The language directly defined what might constitute material
information by connecting it to an objective test and that is when the information has an actual impact
on the stock’s prices. Article 319 in item (D) had broad disclose or abstain rules and express
prohibition same as pre-Chiarella. Item (D) adequately defined who is an insider and did not restrict
its scope for corporate fiduciaries or government officials. Instead, it used “any person” to allow
insider trading prohibitions to cover any person who came into possession of inside information,
disregarding legality of the source of information, and subjected the violator to Article 64 of the
sanction.
Article 319 of the Executive Regulation in item (H) clearly defined insider trading and its
scope. The language includes any person who benefits himself or someone else from trading on the
basis of material, nonpublic information. Benefits do not have to be pecuniary personal benefits. They
could be other personal benefits, direct or indirect, whether for oneself or someone else. This means
Egyptian insider trading regulation does not have the Dirks v. SEC and Salman v. United States personal

113.

This paper did not address the constitutionality of the legislation mechanism of promulgating Executive Regulation
which add to the CML criminalization through a Ministerial Decree.
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benefit issue. Item (H) even established a presumption to satisfy the personal benefit test by saying
that benefiting someone else without any personal direct or indirect benefits would be sufficient to
charge someone with insider trading under Article (64) of the CML.
The Executive Regulation of the CML in Article 324 guaranteed the disclaimer right for any
person charged with insider trading to negate the culpability of insider trading if the reason for his
transaction was for other reasons and not on basis of insider trading. This article ruling exactly
resembles Rule 10b-5-1 “knowing possession” in American law. 114

5. Insider trading prohibition for portfolio management and brokerage companies
The Executive Regulation of the CML in chapter six determined the obligations of portfolio
management and brokerage companies towards their clients, which include obligations of:
Article 214 stipulated that the company in execution of its licensed activities shall adhere to
the principles of honesty, justice, equity, and due diligence.
Article 231 prohibited portfolio management or brokerage companies from selective
disclosure and any direct or indirect discriminatory disclosure between their clients.
Article 244 of section five of chapter six of the executive regulation expressly prohibited insider
trading. It states: “Neither the owner of the portfolio management or brokerage companies nor any
of its directors or employees shall transact on securities on basis of a secret information that is not
publicly disclosed for the market or accessible for the trading public, even if this information or data
was incomplete or was about a forthcoming transaction on these securities or any material action
might affect the securities, its issuer or its prices.”
This article prohibits owners, directors, and employees of a portfolio management company
or brokerage companies from transacting on any securities on the basis of nonpublic information.

114.

See, chapter II Possession vs. Use.
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However, Article 244 express prohibition came under chapter six of the Executive Regulation of the
CML. This chapter only regulates companies established either to provide portfolio management or
brokerage services. It only prevents owners, directors, and employees (the “insiders”) of these two
types of companies from trading on securities on the basis of nonpublic information received by virtue
of their role in these businesses. Yet, this prohibition does not completely address insider trading
cases, as if one of the three insiders mentioned did not trade or transact but tipped inside information
in related to securities transactions.
Hence, the insider trading prohibition of Article 244 of Executive Regulation of CLM is not a
comprehensive criminalization of insider trading that might be committed by owners, directors, and
employees of companies that provide portfolio management and brokerage services. At this point, the
general provisions of insider trading might be applicable to fill the gap of chapter six as in the second
example below.

6. Egyptian court’s insider trading ruling
The Egyptian Criminal Courts made a gap filling in insider trading laws. Cairo Criminal
Misdemeanors Court convicted the regional manager of American Express Bank in Cairo for insider
trading because he traded with others on the basis of material, nonpublic information for personal
benefit. The facts say that Egyptian American Bank planned to sell a large number of its outstanding
shares, and the regional manager knew about this plan because his Bank, American Express, owned
40% of the outstanding shares of Egyptian American Bank (the issuer). The regional manager received
this information by virtue of his place at the American Express. Therefore, he was an insider according
to Article (64) of the CML and should not have traded based on this inside information. 115

115.

Cairo Criminal Misdemeanors Court, financial circuit, case no. 400 for 2005 ordered January 31, 2005.
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Also, the Cairo criminal court for financial crimes convicted the chairman and managing
director of a brokerage firm according to Articles (64) and (68) 116 of the CML because he disclosed
nonpublic information about the stock trading sessions, which came to his knowledge by virtue of his
role at the brokerage firm. The Egyptian State Council affirmed this ruling on appeal and ruled to
discharge the defendant from his chair at the brokerage firm for lack of honesty and trust, which is a
required character trait to be a key employee in a company. 117

III. Enforcement and Charging for Insider Trading
A. Securities and Exchange Commission in the American Legal System
1. Securities enforcement law
In the U.S., the enforcement of securities regulations takes at least five forms: (1) Private
litigation through courts or by arbitration where the plaintiff petitions for damages, contract rescission
and/or equitable relief; (2) SEC enforcement action in administrative proceedings; (3) SEC
enforcement action in Judicial proceedings; (4) Criminal action by the DOJ in federal courts; and (5)
SRO 118 action to sanction its members for violations of its rules. 119
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) is the only prosecuting authority for securities criminal
violations through the U.S. Attorney’s Office. The DOJ often initiates its securities criminal
investigation and prosecution through SEC referrals. 120

116. The actual manager of the company shall be liable to the penalties specified in the provisions of this Law for violations
committed. The company assets shall, in all cases, warrant the payment of the fines.
117. Cairo Financial Criminal Court, financial misdemeanors circuit, case no. 976 for 2004.
118. See, Troy Segal, How does FINRA differ from the SEC?, Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) in the securities industry in
the United States is a not-for-profit entity, and the largest self-regulatory organization, an SRO is a membership-based
organization that creates and enforces rules for members based on federal laws. Available at
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/how-does-finra-differ-sec/
119.

See J. William Hicks, International Dimensions of U.S. Securities Law (2018).
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The SEC derives its investigation powers from section 20(a) and 8(e) of the Securities Act,
section 21(a)(1) 121 and (2) of the Exchange Act, section 209(a) of the Advisers Act, and Investment
Company Act section 42(a). These provisions and federal courts rulings gives the SEC the authority,
in its own discretion, to develop an investigation of particular activities. During its preliminary
investigation, SEC staff may identify certain corporate personnel or officers to interview or to present
certain information, and knowingly and willfully providing false information is a crime. 122 The
Supreme Court held in SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien 123 that the SEC decisions from informal investigation,
formal investigation, bringing a case, or making settlements are considered “administrative
investigations” and its findings are not binding. 124
2. Inside the SEC
In the wake of the stock market crash in 1929, Congress held hearings to investigate related
securities regulations in order to identify the reasons for the problem and to address it adequately.
Based on these hearings, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934
as federal legislation to govern the secondary market of securities. The Exchange Act created the
Securities and Exchange Commission to enforce the newly-passed securities law with the main
responsibility of protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and to facilitate
capital formation. 125

121. Section 21(a)(1) “The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it deems necessary to determine
whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate any provision of this chapter … The Commission is
authorized in its discretion, to publish information concerning any such violations, and to investigate any facts,
conditions, practices, or matters which it may deem necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of such provisions…”
122. Ralph C. Ferrara & Philip S. Khinda, SEC Enforcement Proceedings: Strategic Consideration for when the Agency Comes Calling,
Administrative Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 1143-1195.
123. SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735.
124
. Id.
125 SEC official website, What We Do, available at https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html, the responsibility of
the Commission is to:
1. interpret and enforce federal securities laws;
2. issue new rules and amend existing rules;
3. oversee the inspection of securities firms, brokers, investment advisers, and ratings agencies;
4. oversee private regulatory organizations in the securities, accounting, and auditing fields; and
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The SEC oversees the key participants in the securities market, including securities exchanges,
securities brokers and dealers, investment advisors, and mutual funds. The SEC uses its enforcement
authority in order to protect the stock market from securities violations especially securities fraud.
The SEC still faces some challenges to meet its responsibilities concerning the stock market.
The U.S. securities market is incredible active market 126 and unlawful trading strategies are becoming
more complex and are difficult to identify, as identification requires analysis of large datasets. That
challenges requires even more resources to meet the increasing caseload, and a mass of digital
information needs advanced technology to penetrate this changing landscape. 127 Insider trading cases
expose not just the advanced technical means by which violators obtain secret information, but the
lengths and hard paths they take avoid being caught. 128 That, in turn, stretches the SEC enforcement
scope responsibility into newer areas. The SEC enforcement actions included actions against IT
professionals, hackers who misappropriate corporate data, and providers of political intelligence. 129
Despite the tiny monetary benefits that the violators might gain, the SEC brings enforcement actions
against industry professionals. For example, in June 2017 the SEC brought a settled case against an
auditor who made less US $7,500 by trading ahead based on inside information she received from her
client about a merger. 130
3. The SEC Remedies
In the United States the enforcement of the federal securities laws is left to the SEC and
FINRA in addition to the individual states which enforce its securities laws. 131 The SEC prosecutes

5.

coordinate U.S. securities regulation with federal, state, and foreign authorities.

See ITG, US Trading Volume By Quarter, available at https://www.itg.com/trading-volume/quarter/. The number of
trading shares of the U.S. stock market is over 130 Million share per day.
127. Nagy, Painter, Sachs, Securities Litigation and Enforcement, supra, note 37, at 685.
128. Marc Fagel & associate Elizabeth Dooley, The unrelenting pace of SEC insider trading actions, Global Investigations
Review (GIR), 2017.
129. Id.
130. Id. Donna M. Nagy, Richard W. Painter, and Margaret V. Sachs, Securities Litigation and Enforcement: Cases and
Materials 4th Edition, (2017).
131. Stephen J. Choi &A. C. Pritchard, Securities Regulation cases and analysis, 4th Edition, at 765.
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civil enforcement suits in federal courts and initial administrative proceedings within the SEC against
any person or entities who violate the securities law. 132
In 1984 Congress began to sharpen the SEC insider trading remedies, before 1984 the SEC
may only seek an injunction, order disgorgement of profits or to refer the violator to the Justice
Department to proceed a criminal prosecution. 133 Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act to
add another penalties that the SEC can execute against insider trading violations. 134 which authorize
the SEC to seek a civil penalty of up to three times the amount of profits made or losses avoided by
Rule 10b-5 or 14e-3 violator in addition to any criminal fine ordered. 135
In Fiscal Year 2017 the SEC brought 754 actions and won judgments and orders of amount more
than $3.7 billion in disgorgement and penalties. 136 Further the SEC returned $1.07 billion to harmed
investors, suspended securities of 309 companies, and barred or suspended 625 individuals. 137
3.1. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 and Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984.
Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
("ITSFEA")

to combat the increased insider trading misconduct in the mid-1980s. 138 The ITSFEA

language reflects a strong desire to deter and to sharpen the SEC enforcement weapons against insider
trading. 139 The main provisions of ITSFEA includes the following:

Id.
James Cox, Robert Hillman, Donald Langevoort, Securities Regulations Cases and Materials 7th Edition, at 941.
134. Congress policy of expanding the SEC enforcement tools reached all other securities laws violations, the
enforcement remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 expanded the sanctions available to empower the SEC with
civil penalties and administrative cease-and-desist orders besides its disciplinary authority over market professionals.
132

133.

Id at 941.
The SEC Division of Enforcement ANNUAL REPORT LOOK BACK AT the FISCAL YEAR 2017, available at
https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2017.pdf
137 Id at 3.
138. Stephen J. Choi &A. C. Pritchard, Securities Regulation cases and analysis, 4th Edition, at 381.
139. James Cox, Robert Hillman, Donald Langevoort, supra, at 942.
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1. ITSFEA Section 21A (a) (3) which submitted the controlling person of insider trading violator
for a civil monetary penalty if the controlling person knows or recklessly disregarded the
controlled person insider trade offense.
2. The ITSFEA embolden any person knows about insider trading violation to tip the SEC in
exchange of up to 10% of the penalty collected. 140
3. The ITSFEA confirmed the validity of the SEC insider trading tender offer Rule 14e-3. Before
ITSFEA commentators challenged the validity of Rule 14e-3 questioning at what point the
tender offer actually exist to arise the cause of action for pre-offer activities under Rule 14e3. 141 Farther, does Rule 14e-3 survive the Supreme Court ruling in Chiarella which requires preexistence of a fiduciary duty to disclose? Federal Courts rebutted the first challenge and
determined the scope of insider trading tender offer Rule 14e-3 to include activities that follow
the moment the target board consider the tender offer proposal. 142 Regarding the second
challenge, ITSFEA reflect Congress intent in granting the SEC more powerful authority to
combat and define fraud in Rule 14e-3. The ITSFEA grants the SEC the authority to define
what constitute fraudulent conduct and to adopt within its owns discretion authority the
reasonable means to stop such fraudulent practices. 143
3.2.

Injunctions.
The enforcement of the securities laws often requires permanent injunctions against violators

to prevent future violations. 144 Many provisions like section 21 (A) of the Exchange Act, Section 20(b)
of the Securities Act, and Section 42 (d) of the Investment Company Act gives the SEC the authority
Id.
Howard M. Friedman, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 465 (1990).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol68/iss3/2
142. O'Connor & Associates v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also Howard M. Friedman,
supra at 473.
143. Howard M. Friedman, supra at 473.
144. Marc I. Steinberg, SEC and Other Permanent Injunctions-Standards for Their Imposition Modification and Dissolution, 66
Cornell L. Rev.27 (1980).
140.
141.
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to seek a permanent or temporary injunction remedies against any person engaged or about to engage
in practices that constitute a violation of the Exchange Act or other related securities law. 145 Even
though issuance of the injunctions might seems “mild prophylactic” its effect could be sever because
the SEC could build the injunction on “likelihood” grounds and a past violations not actual new
facts. 146 The SEC often pray for relief in addition to the injunction remedy, the SEC tailored the relief
to be in convenient to the violation and violator circumstances. These remedies could take the form
of disgorgement of the ill-gotten profits, 147 securities sale rescission, appointment of a special counsel
to carry out an inside investigation about the corporation and its management or to appoint an
independent manager to the violated company. 148

4. SEC Divisions
The SEC functions through five Divisions and 23 Offices. 149 The Commission's staff are
located in Washington and in 11 Regional Offices throughout the country. 150 These Divisions are: 151
1. Division of Corporation Finance: Oversee corporate disclosure of continuing and
diperiodic information to the investing public.

145.

James Cox, Robert Hillman, Donald Langevoort, supra, at 854.
Id.
147. Disgorgement is not a penalty but is a kind of sanctions meant to prevent unjust enrichment, yet when the amount
of disgorgement exceeds the ill-gotten gains deemed a penalty. See James Cox, Robert Hillman, Donald Langevoort,
supra, at 856.
148. Id. One of the SEC enforcement tools “Obey the Law” injunction orders, the SEC utilize this mechanism to issue
broad obey the securities law request, so any future violation will give rise to an enforcement action.
149. Offices: Office of the General Counsel, Office of the Chief Accountant, Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations, Office of Credit Ratings, Office of International Affairs, Office of Investor Education and Advocacy,
Office of Municipal Securities, Office of Ethics Counsel, Office of the Investor Advocate, Office of Women and Minority
Inclusion, Office of the Chief Operating Officer, EDGAR Business Office , Office of Acquisitions, Office of Financial
Management, Office of Support Operations, Office of Human Resources, Office of Information Technology, Office of
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, Office of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary, Office of Equal Employment
Opportunity, Office of the Inspector General, Office of Administrative Law Judges.
121. SEC official website, supra.
151. Id.
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2. Division of Trading and Markets: Enforce the SEC responsibility for maintaining fair,
orderly, and efficient markets.
3. Division of Investment Management: Protect and promote investors interest on capital
formation through oversight and regulation of America's $66.8 trillion investment
management industry.
4. Division of Enforcement: Prosecuting division that investigates securities violations and
recommends commencement of civil actions in federal court or as administrative proceedings
before an administrative law judge. The staff of this division is composed of 1,452 attorneys,
accountants, analysts and other professionals. 152
5. Division of Economic and Risk Analysis: Its main responsibility is to integrate robust
economic analysis and rigorous data analytics into the work of the SEC. Further, to educate
and support investors to function efficient markets by providing vital support in the form of
economic analyses through its website which includes EDGAR database. Further, the division
staff provide the economic analysis and research, risk assessment, and data analytics. 153

5. The SEC Investigatory Process:
The SEC insider trading enforcement process is divided into four main phases: “detection,
preliminary investigation, formal investigation, and prosecution.” 154 The reason for empowering the
SEC by enforcement authority is that numerous regulatory provisions of the securities laws create
problems that might prevent a meaningful pursuit of violations by private plaintiffs. 155 This is because

See Congressional Budget Justification FY 2017. available at
https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy17congbudgjust.pdf
153. Id.
154 Andrew P. Van Osselaer, Insider Trading Enforcement & Link Prediction, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 399 (2017).
155. James D. cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 Duke L. J. 737, 743-44 (2003).
152.
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of the nature of the regulations, which focus not on investor protection as such, but rather in achieving
desired efficiency and general confidence in the market. 156

5.1.

The SEC detection, preliminary investigation, and formal investigation

According to the Division of Enforcement, Enforcement Manual, processing a securities fraud
investigation includes certain procedures, includes the following: 157
The public can complain or tip the SEC through SEC’s online website 158 or by contacting any
of the SEC’s offices. After assessing the reliability of the tip, the complaint or the referral the staff
processes it according to the SEC manual. 159 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act established a Whistleblower Award Program for any person who provides information
that results in monetary sanctions of over $1 million on a successful enforcement action, which awards
a person 10-30% of the total monetary sanctions.
The SEC Division of Enforcement in ranking its investigations policies devotes more resources to
investigate cases deemed “National Priority Matters.” In order to classify an investigation as National
Priority Matters, they consider some criteria such as (1) Deterrence for a potentially widespread
misconduct; (2) The position occupied by the violator; (3) Is there a violation of newly-enacted
legislation; (4) The riskiness of the misconduct for investors or important sector of the market; and
(5) Does the matter affect a significant number of potential or vulnerable victims.
Based on those criteria and the type of violation, the Division of Enforcement handles some referrals
with great care as if the case related to Bank Secrecy or the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board.

id
SEC, Division of Enforcement, Enforcement Manual, (2017) available at www.sec.gov.
158. SEC Center for Complaints and Enforcement Tips, available at http://www.sec.gov/complaint.shtml)
156.
157.

159.

SEC, Enforcement Manual, supra page 12.
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After receiving a tip or a referral, a staff member searches -- in light of the Division procedures
and the Assistant Director’s guidance -- the potentiality of executing a successful enforcement case. If
the staff reach a positive possibility of successful investigation, she signs in to a Hub system and
recommends opening a Matters Under Inquiry (MUI) and also suggests the office that should process
the MUI for the sake of achieving the best use of the resources of the Division. The fate of the MUI
is that it is either closed or converted to an investigation, and the staff in consultation with the
Associate Director or the Unit Chief will determine the fate of the MUI. If it is turned into an
investigation, securities law authorizes SEC and its officers to issue subpoenas for a witness to present
a document or to take a testimony under oath. In some urgent cases the Commission delegates to one
of the staffs to act on his own discretion on her behalf as a Duty Officer.
The SEC in administrative proceedings can bar a person from association with a broker-dealer
or investment adviser if there was a civil or criminal conviction against him. The SEC encourages its
staff to close an investigation when it becomes apparent that no further steps can be taken. The staff
member should consider the seriousness of violations, resources available for investigation, the
strength of the evidence, who will be harmed if he decides to close, and the age of the violation when
he decides the proper proceeding of the investigation. Closing an investigation will be followed by
termination notices to be sent to every person who was involved in the investigation. Successful
enforcement action cannot be closed unless all enforcement is completed either by a final judgment
or Commission order and after paying the monetary relief in full.
The SEC under certain considerations may continue its own investigations even if there is an ongoing
SEC litigation. This investigation requires an independent good-faith basis as if there is a possibility
to add to the litigation additional violators. SEC adopts a clear policy in its dealing with the press and
how to ask for production of documents or information. SEC staff must begin with informal channels
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first to obtain the information or the documents in hands of the media member entity. If the
negotiations do not succeed, an assessment will be taken before seeking issuance of a subpoena. 160
When an SEC staff contacts any individual for an investigation she must, and before asking
any substantive questions, make certain disclosures under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. For
example, she must declare that even if the laws authorize the SEC to ask for information, a witness is
not required to cooperate and there is no direct effect upon her for refusing to disclose information
she might have disclosed. Further, SEC Rule 7 (b) allows any person who appears in person at a formal
investigation to be accompanied, represented and advised by counsel.
The SEC Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) (used for
Criminal Matters), ad hoc, and voluntary cooperation are the channels available to the SEC to contact
a foreign witness residing in another country. SEC’s Office of International Affairs will review and
guide the staff members work to request information from a foreign person without violating other
countries laws.

5.2

SEC Detection mechanism

SEC has taken an aggressive stance against insider traders, unrelenting against those who abuse
nonpublic information and made it clear “No Place to Hide”. 161 Insider trading typically comprises
approximately 10% of the SEC caseload. 162 The SEC’s tech-policy utilizes the fact that in a wired
globe, people are more closely connected than we imagine. 163 The SEC’s tech-enforcement procedures
are based on development of in-house, automated, market-data-analysis systems. These systems are

For more details see SEC, Enforcement Manual, supra page 40 and thereafter.
Andrew P. Van Osselaer, Insider Trading Enforcement & Link Prediction, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 399 (2017). & The statement of
Former SEC Chair Mary Jo White.
162. Marc Fagel & associate Elizabeth Dooley, The unrelenting pace of SEC insider trading actions, Global Investigations
Review (GIR) (2017).
163. Osselaer, Insider Trading Enforcement & Link Prediction, supra at 412 footnote 82. He refers to Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REv. 327, 354 (2015). This study says among
Facebook users the "average number of acquaintances separating any two people in the world was not six [as is often
said colloquially] but 4.74").
160.
161.
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able to detect suspicious trades, and therefore reduce the Commission’s reliance on outside tips. 164
The SEC uses software techniques like link prediction, data synthesis, and algorithms to trace the
connection between two points on a network using breadth-first bilateral analysis. 165
The Commission adopted Rule 613 Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) to create a comprehensive
consolidated audit trail which allows regulators to accurately track all activity throughout the U.S.
markets in National Market System (NMS) securities. 166 The (CAT) compiles every trade order,
execution, or cancellation process to be pulled from national stock exchanges and FINRA databases,
and by using the algorithmic detection systems on all national-market trading data, the CAT system
enables SEC to be everywhere at once. 167
The SEC Market Abuse Unit depends on three market-analysis programs: (1) ARTEMIS, which is
built to detect suspicious trading patterns among traders; (2) ABAP, which is designed to analyze
specific transactions in order to detect suspicious trading before market-moving causes and shows the
coordinated transactions; and (3) NEAT, which is designed to allow enforcement investigators rapid
access to transactions from a massive index. 168

6. Cross-border insider trading
The globalization of securities markets and the rapid increase in the number of cross-border
mergers and acquisitions has created the environment where the largest insider trading violations are

Id. at 399.
Id. at 407. The author refers to an article that discusses the Graph traversal technique, available at
https://www.hackerearth.com/practice/algorithms/graphs/breadth-first-search/tutorial/.
166. The SEC website, Rule 613 (Consolidated Audit Trail), available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/rule613info.htm.
167. Osselaer, Insider Trading Enforcement & Link Prediction, supra at 406.
168. Mary Jo White, Chair, Opening Remarks at the 21st Annual International Institute for Securities Enforcement and Market
Oversight (Nov. 2, 2015) https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/remarks-21st-international-institute-for-securitiesenforcement.html.
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committed. 169 A securities violation committed while trading shares of a foreign company listed in the
U.S. abuses both the domestic and U.S. market mechanisms. 170
Under some circumstances, foreign investors prefer to litigate their securities disputes in the
United States because of some practical advantages which include: (1) the possibility of their action
being brought in the form of class action; (2) the possibility of a well-compensating jury verdict (3)
generous discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (4) the possibility of obtaining
legal assistance on the basis of a contingent attorney’s fee and the absence of a loser-pays rule.
There is no certain SEC policy on when U.S. insider trading rules will be extraterritorially
applicable, but based on SEC enforcement actions “it is that the trading site -- the use of U.S. market
mechanisms -- that counts most.” 171 The SEC defines “foreign issuer” broadly to include: foreign
issuer “foreign government”, supranational entities, foreign private issuers; Essentially U.S. issuers
who do not qualify as a foreign private issuer, and certain Canadian private issuers. 172 A foreign issuer
might be subject to the U.S. Securities Act of 1934 either because of the size of issued securities or
because of his free will. 173
In the 1960s, the increase of international stock markets infused the enforcement of the
American federal domestic regulations. 174 American lower courts, in order to decide their jurisdiction
over securities fraud cases that include a foreign element, adopted some principles based on where
the fraudulent conduct occurred (the conduct test) and the nationality of the injured investor or issuer

Donald C. Langevoort, Cross-Border Insider Trading, 19 Dick. J. Int'l L. 161 (2000).
Id.
171. Langevoort, Cross-Border Insider Trading, supra at 162.
172. § 240.3b-4 provides a definition of “foreign government,” “foreign issuer” and “foreign private issuer”.
173. Id.
174. Nagy, Painter, Sachs, Securities Litigation and Enforcement, supra, note 37, at 985.
169.
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(the effects test). 175 This custom of adjudicating the jurisdiction over these kind of cases lasted until
2010, when the Supreme Court decided Morrison v. National Australia Bank ltd. 176

7. Morrison v. National Australia Bank ltd 177
In this case the United States Supreme Court decided “whether § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American
defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.” 178
The Supreme Court ruled that Section 10(b) does not provide a cause of action to a foreign
plaintiff suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded
on foreign exchanges. The Court stated: “[W]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none. It is a longstanding principle of American law that legislation
of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States. If § 10(b) is not extraterritorial, neither is Rule 10b–5. On its face, § 10(b) contains
nothing to suggest that it applies abroad.” 179 Also, the Court rejected the notion that the Exchange
Act provisions reach conduct that occurred in the United States and affect exchanges or transactions
175.

At that time Langevoort, argued that “the forces creating an internationalized securities marketplace, the prevailing
extraterritoriality doctrine has become both useless and problematic.” See Donald C. Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revisited:
Limiting the Scope of Antifraud Protection in an Internationalized Securities Marketplace, 55 Law and ContemporaryProblems 241-261
(Fall 1992).
176. Morrison v. National Australia Bank ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
177. Id.
178. Id. The respondent in the case was National Australia Bank (National), an Australian Bank whose shares were not
traded on any stock exchange in the United States. National purchased HomeSide Lending, an American mortgageservicing company headquartered in Florida. When National wrote down in its books the value of HomeSide’s assets,
National’s share prices fell. The petitioner is an Australian shareholder of National that sued National, HomeSide, and
officers of both companies for loss the shareholder suffered because of the write-downs of HomeSide’s assets. He claimed
that the defendants violated §10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b–5. He claimed that
“HomeSide and its officers had manipulated financial models to make the company’s mortgage-servicing rights appear
more valuable than they really were; and that National and its chief executive officer were aware of this deception.”
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. Id. 561 U.S. at 247. The court ruled that saying there is a domestic activity in the United States where HomeSide
executives engaged in the alleged deceptive conduct and that shall trigger the U.S. subject matter jurisdiction is
rebuttable by the fact that “the Exchange Act’s focus is not on the place where the deception originated, but on
purchases and sales of securities in the United States. Section 10(b) applies only to transactions in securities listed on
domestic exchanges and domestic transactions in other securities.”
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abroad, stating that the law is so obvious that if Congress intended such foreign application ‘‘it would
have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws and procedures.’’ 180 Hence, in Morrison, the
Supreme Court sought to limit the extraterritorial reach of the antifraud provisions of the U.S.
securities laws. The Court has scaled down the exposure of foreign issuers to securities liability risk,
particularly in class-action litigation. 181
One month after the Supreme Court ruling on Morrison v. National Australia Bank, President
Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. Dodd-Frank Act amended the jurisdictional
provision of section 22 of the Securities Act and section 27 of the Exchange Act to resuscitate the old
jurisdiction conducts and effects tests. 182 The effect test “whether the wrongful conduct had a
substantial effect in the United States or upon United States citizens” and conduct test “whether the
wrongful conduct occurred in the United States.” 183
On March 2017, the District of Utah in SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC 184 ruled that Dodd-Frank’s
amendments plain language did not expressly overturn the Supreme Court ruling on Morrison. Further
the court said Congress had clearly intended to authorize the SEC and DOJ to sue on bases of conduct
or effects within the United States, regardless of where the securities transactions occurred. 185

Id. 561 U.S. at 247
Yuliya Guseva, The SEC and Foreign Private Issuers: A Path to Optimal Public Enforcement, 59 B.C.L. Rev. 2055 (2018).
182. Nagy, Painter, Sachs, Securities Litigation and Enforcement, supra, note 37, at 1000.
Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which amended Section 22 of the Securities Act and Section 27 of the
Exchange Act added the following language: The district courts of the United States and the United States court of any
territory shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or by the United
States alleging a violation of [either Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act or Section 17(a) of the Securities Act]
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(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities
transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; or
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.
183 Nagy, Painter, Sachs, Securities Litigation and Enforcement, supra, note 37, at 995-999. see also SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d
187,192 (2003). The Second Circuit in order to justify its jurisdiction over cases with the international element used to
apply these two tests distinctly but in recent precedents, the court combined them together to show a strong relevance.
184. SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1275.
185..Jonathan E. Richman, Proskauer Rose Discusses the SEC’s Extraterritorial Reach, (2017).
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However, the Dodd Frank provisions is very important to insider trading enforcement because it
allows the SEC and DOJ to prosecute cases no matter where the securities was listed or purchased.

2 Detection and Surveillance Role of NYSE and NASDAQ
The New York Stock Exchange LLC (“NYSE”) and the National Association of Securities
Dealers Automated Quotation INC (“NASDAQ”) are a Self-Regulatory Organizations and they are
the largest two equities-based and electronic screen-based stock exchanges in the world. 186 The NYSE
and NASDAQ have their own regulatory procedures to curtail insider trading. NYSE and NASDAQ
as the market they have incredibly sophisticated algorithms and computer programs that flag out of
the ordinary trading and alert the SEC to out of ordinary trading. In turn, the SEC’s sophisticated
computer programs look to see what news developments there were and then they run lists of people
who purchased and examine it in order to identify if any of these people who have access to inside
information are involved in these securities transactions at all. 187

1. The New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”)
NYSE has its own regulations for monitoring securities activities and addressing non-compliance with
its rules and federal securities laws. NYSE regulations “promote just and equitable principles of trade,

There are currently 13 registered stock exchanges operating in the United States, See, http://www.trade.education/list-ofstock-exchanges. See also, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nyse.asp. Section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act defines the term
“exchange” as “any organization, association, or group of persons, whether incorporated or unincorporated, which
constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or
for otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange as that term
is generally understood, and includes the market place and the market facilities maintained by such exchange”.
187 More than 85% of Insider Trading violations are correlated to five different news categories: "Product
announcements, Earnings announcements, Regulatory approval or denials, Mergers and acquisitions or Research
reports, which they collectively refer to as PERM-R events" see Adarsh Kulkarni & Priya Mani &Carlotta Domeniconi,
Network-based Anomaly Detection for Insider Trading, (2017). Available at https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.05809.pdf there study seek
to identify -mathematically- patterns that capture the relationship between trading behaviors of insiders through
collecting insider trade filings by the SEC through the EDGAR “with the aim of initiating an automated large-scale and
data-driven approach to the problem of identifying illegal insider trading.”
186.
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encourage free and open markets, and protect investors and the public interest.” 188 The NYSE’s
insider trading detection techniques have moved to tech-enforcement and apply computer algorithmbased programs to prediction and data synthesis similar to the SEC’ detection mechanism we
previously discussed in 5.2. However, there is an individual “middleman” in NYSE trading floor sit
behind every securities transaction, we will examine the authorities and regulations that govern that
person activities in order to curtail insider trading.
The market structure of the NYSE is an auction market. The middleman who matches the
best price for the purchaser with the best price for the seller called “Designated Market
Maker” (DMM) formerly known by “the specialist”. DMM plays a crucial role on stock trading
process on NYSE. Section 240.11b-1 of the Exchange Act referred to the DMM by a member who
“act as a dealer” and in the same time referred to him by who “act as broker”. 189 The DMM
responsibilities are: 190 (1) To maintain their assigned securities markets fairly and orderly; (2) To act as
dealer by matching the highest bid with the lowest offer of certain stocks they are assigned; 191 (3) To
engage in with their own account, using their own capital, and with an informed decision to reduce
market volatility. (4) To facilitate price discovery trading to treat market imbalances or instability in
case there is no sufficient buyers or sellers. 192 DMM failure “[T]o engage in such a course of dealings
will result in the suspension or cancellation of such specialist's registration in one or more of the
securities in which such specialist is registered.” 193

1.1 Regulations govern the DMM’s role in NYSE

https://www.nyse.com/regulation
See Section 3(a)(4)(A) of the Exchange Act for broker-dealer’s definitions.
190. According to Section 240.11b-1 of the Exchange Act & NYSE Rule 104 Governing Transactions by DMM.
191. Most specialists are responsible for trading five to ten stocks, See https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/answersspecialisthtm.html.
192. NYSE Rule 104 (f)(ii).
193. Section 240.11b-1-ii.
188
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The NYSE exercise its surveillance authority over the DMM at the end of the trading day and
modifies DMM’s prohibited Transactions in three ways: 194
First, Since the rule already prohibits transactions that will create a new high or low price, the NYSE
will also modify “Aggressing Transactions” that will result a new consolidated price. 195 Second, in
determining prohibited transactions NYSE will not only consider the DMM’s position as defining
feature in its decision regarding prohibited transactions. Third, shorten the period of announcing the
DMM’s prohibited transactions to the market.
Further, the DMM could be the first tier of measures to prevent securities fraud. Hence, NYSE
had set of a very detailed regulations and rules governing the conduct and actions of the DMM to
ensure that the securities are properly and fairly traded. 196 Rule 2020 of the NYSE rules reads “No
member or member organization shall effect any transaction in, or induce the purchase or sale of, any
security by means of any manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent device or contrivance.” 197 The
NYSE Regulation (“NYSER”) of detection and surveillance overseeing the trading activities on the
NYSE markets and enforce compliance with securities regulations. 198
Prior to January 2016, the NYSE outsources its surveillance and enforcement of regulations
to the Financial Industry Regulation Authority (“FINRA”) through contract. After the contract period
NYSER is to take the responsibility of surveillance, investigation, and enforcement of regulations in
the NYSE markets while FINRA will continue performing surveillance on the cross-market

194.

NYSE Rule 104(g)(i)(A)(III).
The SEC Release No. 34-84515, defined Aggressing Transaction by “the DMM transaction that is (1) a purchase
(sale) that reaches across the market to trade as the contra-side to the Exchange published offer (bid); and (2) priced
above (below) the last differently-priced trade on the Exchange and above (below) the last differently-priced published
offer (bid) on the Exchange”.
196. See rules of Dealings and Settlements (Rules 45—299C) & Rule Regulation of the Exchange and its Member
Organizations.
195.

194.

NYSE website, available at https://www.nyse.com/regulation.
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transactions. 199 The DMM are obliged to electronically submit all of the information regarding its
trading activities to the NYSE. This information will be gathered in the Intermarket Surveillance
Information System (ISIS) of the NYSE. 200 The ISIS information will be used to observe price
movements and detect market unusual trading patterns. Computer formulas techniques will examine
insider trading through analyzing ISIS data and detect market activities that has the characteristics of
a trading activity that violates the rules.

2. The National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
(“NASDAQ”) 201
NASDAQ market developed by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) to be
a stock market that service electronic securities trading internationally. “The Nasdaq Stock Market has
three distinctive tiers: The Nasdaq Global Select Market, The Nasdaq Global Market and The Nasdaq
Capital Market. Applicants must satisfy certain financial, liquidity and corporate governance
requirements to be approved for listing on any of these market tiers.” 202
The market structure of NASDAQ is different from that of the NYSE. The model of NASDAQ as
an electronic screen-based system was initially created to serve as an option to the specialist-based
system. 203 NASDAQ is a dealer’s market where the sellers and the purchasers will not be participating
in a direct trade but will be trading through a dealer. In the NYSE, the DMM are the market makers
while in NASDAQ, the market makers are the dealers who will be on at least on side of every trade.204

2.1 Regulations govern the dealer’s role in NASDAQ
NYSE, REGULATORY INFORMATION MEMO – ALL NYSE MARKETS (2015), available at
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/nyse/rule-interpretations/2015/NYSE%2015-8.pdf.
200. James L. Cochrane, Brian McNamara, James E. Shapiro, Michael J. Simon, The Structure and Regulation of the New York
Stock Exchange, Journal of Corporation Law (1993).
201. NASDAQ Inc is an American international financial services corporation that owns and operates
the NASDAQ stock market and eight European stock exchanges. See, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nasdaq,_Inc.
202. See Nasdaq Listing Center, Initial Listing Guide, (2018).
203. WILL KENTON, Nasdaq, (Updated Apr 1, 2018) https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nasdaq.asp.
204. James L. Cochrane, Brian McNamara, James E. Shapiro, Michael J. Simon, The Structure and Regulation of the New York
Stock Exchange supra, note 173.
199.
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The dealers that are the members of NASDAQ are subject, in strict compliance, to the rules
and regulations of the SEC, FINRA, and NASDAQ itself. That rules includes the minimum capital,
sales methods, trade practices, record of information, and protection of funds of the customers. The
rules and regulations imposed on NASDAQ’s dealers are also served as a first-level measure against
securities fraud. 205
For the purpose of detection and surveillance, NASDAQ employed supplementary measures
in addition to the rules and regulations imposed on its dealers. Securities Exchange Act obliges issuers
having their securities traded on NASDAQ to file an annual report and to provide NASDAQ with
any information requested in case of any suspicious market activities. The filing process will be done
electronically through the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, Retrieval “EDGAR”. 206 As we said in
NYSE, NASDAQ also applied advanced technology techniques to detect insider trading violations.
Artificial Intelligence has been adopted by NASDAQ to surveil insider trading and securities fraud.
The software indicates the transaction that has unusual linkage of interests. The information of any
suspicious trading activity will be passed to the SEC for investigation. 207
Furthermore, NASDAQ has recently introduced the SMARTS Trade Surveillance and
SMARTS Market Surveillance systems for detecting of various kinds of securities fraud or dark trading
activities including but not limited to price control and insider trading. 208The SMARTS Market
Surveillance system is described as “the industry benchmark for the real-time and T1 solutions for
market surveillance, supervision, and compliance.” 209 The SMARTS Trade Surveillance system focuses
specifically on the surveillance and monitor of trading activities rather than the market as a whole. It
NASDAQ, INC. FORM 10-K, available at http://ir.nasdaq.com/static-files/a6d84f2a-c05a-484d-9d3b-06573888344f.
SEC, Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration available at https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investorpublications/divisionsmarketregbdguidehtm.html#foot1.
207. Sara Hedberg, IJCAI-03 Conference Highlights, AI Magazine Volume 24 (2003).
208. Roy Girasa & Jessica A. Magaldi & Joseph DiBenedetto, Shedding Light on Dark Pools: Recent Regulatory Attempts Toward
Transparency And Oversight Of Alternative Trading Systems, (2018).
209. Nasdaq, MARKET SURVEILLANCE, available at https://business.nasdaq.com/markettech/marketplaces/market-surveillance.
205.
206.
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alerts the compliance teams of the seller in case of an appearance of any suspicious trading activities
resulting from the detection, investigation, or system analysis. 210

210.

Id.
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C. Prosecution of Insider Trading in the Egyptian Legal System
The Public Prosecutor's Office is the main Egyptian authority empowered to initiate all kinds
of criminal charges. To reach the end of justice, the law, in some circumstances, limits Public
Prosecutor's Office prosecuting authority and makes it contingent on another entity’s request.
Egyptian’s Capital Market Law (CML) makes the Public Prosecutor's Office authority to charge for
securities violations contingent on a written permission from the chairman of the Financial Regularity
Authority.
1. Financial Regularity Authority and the Public Prosecutor's Office Prosecutions:
In order to unify the supervisory authority over the entire Egyptian non-banking financial
markets, Article 3 of Law no.10 of 2009 replaced the Capital Market Authority by the Financial
Regularity Authority (FRA). 211 The legislator wanted FRA to be the public authority in charge to
enforce the provisions of CML 95 of 1992 over the entire Egyptian Stock Market. The FRA is an
independent surveillance authority over the Egyptian stock market. Article 93 of the Executive
Regulations of CML states that “the Authority (FSA) shall oversee the trading market and shall ensure
compliance with the law and the executive regulations with respect to prohibited activities, such as
fictitious transactions, price rigging, deceptive devices, cheating, manipulation and fraudulent activities
in connection with securities transactions.” Hence, the FRA is the main governmental authority in
charge of achieving the stability and integrity of all of the non-banking financial markets. Additionally,
the FRA in the Egyptian legal system is responsible for spreading investment culture and also licenses
non-banking financial activities.

211. We may also refer to FRA by Egyptian Financial Supervision Authority (EFSA). see FRA official website at
http://www.fra.gov.eg/content/efsa_en/efsa_pages_en/efsa_clarification_en.htm.
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This means that the FRA not only exercises its surveillance authority over listed companies.
Its authority extends, according to Egyptian companies’ law no. 159 of 1981 to Joint Stock Companies,
Limited Partnerships by Shares, and Limited Liability Partnerships.

1.1 FRA Enforcement Resources
The Egyptian FRA executes its obligations through the following sectors and offices: 212
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Sector of Financial Securities, Financial Statements and Corporate Finance;
Sector of Surveillance and Corporate Governance;
Sector of New Business Registration and Licensing;
Sector of Information Services;
Sector of Financial, Administrative Affairs and Personnel;
Central Department for Chairman’s Office Affairs;
Central Department for Legal Affairs;
Central Department for Enforcement;
Central Department for Researches and Policies
Central Department for Capital Market Development and its Securities;
Central Department for Investors Complaints;
Central Department for customer Services;
Central Department for Governmental Insurance Fund

The Egyptian FRA issued its own code of ethics for its personnel to prohibit any action that might
undermine public trust and the integrity of the Authority, these rules are: 213
(1) Fundamental ethics: The staff shall observe the integrity and good conduct needed to gain public
trust, fairness, and non-discrimination in their interaction with the public, executing their job tasks
with due diligence, cooperating with other FRA staff, being transparent without violating protected
information, and observing a high level of decorum with any person interacting with the Authority.

212. FRA official website, available at http://www.fra.gov.eg/content/efsa_en/efsa_pages_en/dir1_en.htm, last visit
December 7, 2018.
213. See the decree of the FRA Chairman no. 75 on June 7, 2010.
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(2) Exchange of data and private information: Staff shall maintain capital market information
privacy and not share it outside the Authority; Staff shall take all necessary precautions to keep all
private information secret; It is prohibited for the FRA staff, except those who are authorized, to
make a press release (especially information related to stock prices and corporations listed on the stock
market, and any corporate information discovered as a result of the FRA surveillance procedures); It
is prohibited for the FRA staff or their relatives to receive any benefits in exploiting nonpublic
information that is possessed as a result of being in an FRA personnel role.
(3) Trade on Stock Market: FRA staff are not allowed to trade personally, or through any other
person, on listed corporation stocks except in IPOs, public mutual funds, governmental pounds, or
unlisted securities. If any of the FRA owns or inherited stocks in Egyptian Exchange (EXG) when
this decree comes into force, he shall not sell it before putting the FRA on notice.
(4) Gifts and Courtesy Policy: FRA staff are prohibited from accepting any gifts from any entity
subject to FRA surveillance authority except if it was nominal; gifts do not have to be pecuniary but
could be a discount for a service received or a free vacation for the staff member or his relatives.

1.2 FRA Detection Mechanism
There are three main systems of detection adopted by the FRA:
(1) Observation of Stock Market bids: The FRA Central Department of Enforcement has a
unit connected with the Egyptian Stock Exchange trading screens. The units observe the
transactions and take notes for bids and deals closed by broker-dealer’s firms and then track
its future impact on stock prices. If there was any suspicious activity committed, the unit will
open an investigation to address any possible enforcement action.
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(2) Corporation’s file examination: This way of surveillance is executed by examining a
corporation’s file and its periodical financial and administrative reports presented to the FRA.
(3) Corporation field visit: The CML grants the FRA staff the powers and authority of law
enforcement officers. FRA staff may or may not notify corporations about FRA’s pending
field visits, they will examine the corporation’s books and ask for the production of any
specific documents, or question any of the corporation’s personnel in order to ensure the
correct observation of the regulations.

1.3 FRA Prosecuting Authority
The Egyptian FRA resembles the American SEC in its role of oversight and ensuring
compliance with the law of the stock market. CML in article 69 (bis) states: “It shall not be allowed to
prosecute for crimes of CML except by virtue of a written request from the chairman of the Financial
Regularity Authority” 214 Thus the law gives FRA’s chairman – solely – the authority to initiate criminal
charges of insider trading or any securities fraud committed in violation of CML and its Executive
Regulations. The mechanism of the criminal charges under CML begins by a report signed by the
chairman of the FRA that includes an explanation of violations and asks the Public Prosecutor's Office
to initiate criminal charges. This report is an administrative report, not a judicial order, which means
it does not initiate the criminal prosecution and is not subject to judicial review. 215 The report will give
the Public Prosecutor's Office the authority to initiate criminal charges. The FRA report does not
oblige the Office to prosecute as the Office has the discretion to investigate and proceed with the
charges.

214. Article 69 (bis) added by law no. 123 for 2008. Also, article 6 of law no. 10 for 2009, bar Public Prosecutor's Office
from initiating a criminal investigation without a written consent from FRA.
215. Nisreen F. Ibrahim, Alreqaba Aledareyaha Wal qdaieyaha Ala A’mal Aledaraha fe Magal Souq AlAwraq Al malyiah [The
administrative and judicial surveillance over the public administrative authority role on stock market] (2016).
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On the other hand, if the Public Prosecutor's Office by any source knows about CML violation and
desires to initiate criminal charges against the violators, the Public Prosecutor's Office is required to
obtain FRA chairman permission to proceed with the Office’s investigations. CML also empowers
the chairman of the FRA with the authority to cancel or to dismiss charges despite the state of progress
in investigations or court judgment execution. 216
Article 49 of the CML grants the FRA officers the power and authority of law enforcement officers.
This authorize officers of FRA to access the registers, books, documents and any information in the
company's offices, in the stock exchange, or other offices where these documents may exist. It also
obliges such entities to cooperate and to produce a copy of any documents that may be requested by
officers. This article reflects the intent of the Egyptian legislature to curtail securities market violations
and to reach a reasonable level of efficiency. It suggests that the FRA obligations are not merely to
issue licenses and permit securities offering, but to take positive steps to reduce market violation.

1.4 FRA Administrative sanctions:
Besides its prosecuting authority, the FRA has the power to apply administrative sanctions for
corporate violations. According to article 31 of the CML, these sanctions could be a notice asking the
company to cancel or stop the violations within a specific timeline, could limit the company scope of
business, 217 or could be the appointing of an independent member on the company board of directors.
The appointed member will oversee and participate in the board decisions. Also, FRA sanctions could
reach to dissolution of the board and appointment of an authorized agent until a new board of

216.

The policy objectives behind authorizing the FRA chairman to enter into settlement or reconciliation agreement with
the convicted of securities fraud is to trump the economic benefits over the incarceration punishment when the
convicted accept to pay the double of the statutory fine. We do not agree with this policy because deterrence could not
be achieved especially when the defendant is a corporation or a wealthy businessman.
217. See FRA Chairman decree no. 885 for 2018 to freeze trading activities of Grand Investment company for a month
and see also decree no. 888 for 2018 to freeze the activities of TIBA for Securities Brokerage for a month.
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directors is appointed or could be the compulsion of the company to raise its deposited security
deposit to protect the investors.
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2. Egyptian Stock Exchange
The Egyptian market used to have two Stock Exchanges, Alexandria and Cairo Stock Exchange. The
law no. 123 for 2008 merged them together into one Stock Exchange called the Egyptian Stock
Exchange (EXG). Under Rule 902(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) is
an offshore securities market. 218 The EXG is a governmental public entity, but the CML allows the
establishment of private corporations to exercise stock exchange business. 219 EXG executes its
responsibilities through a board of 9 members headed by the EXG chairman and includes a member
from the Egyptian Central Bank. 3 members represent Capital Market companies, and 2 members
representing listed companies. 220 EXG decrees are administrative orders amenable to judicial review. 221
The EXG board of directors regulates the stock market trading rules and oversees its efficiency. The
Egyptian Exchange (EGX) is the primary and secondary equity market and exchange for both stocks
and bonds. 222 EGX consists of the Official Market which includes publicly listed companies and the
Unofficial Market, where the transfer of unlisted securities takes place. The Unofficial Market
transactions are still subject to revision and approval of EGX. 223
Article 21 of CML states: The chairman of EXG may suspend trading bids aiming at price
manipulation, and he may revoke transactions which violate securities market regulations. He may also
suspend the trading of a given security in case it causes harm to the market or may revoke transactions
that are executed in violation of the CML securities provision.

SEC website, Securities Act of 1933 -Rule 902(b) of Regulation S, letter to the Chairman of Cairo and Alexandria Stock
Exchanges (CASE), available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/cairo041603.htm.
219. See article 26 of the CML, supra.
220. See article 6 of the presidential decree no. 191 for 2009.
221. Nisreen F. Ibrahim, supra at
222. Omar S Bassiouny & Ahmed Abdelgawad, Equity capital markets in Egypt: regulatory overview, (2016).
223. Id.
218.
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3. Private right of action under Egyptian law
Egyptian Law allows bringing a case for Civil Remedies incurred as a result of violations of
the securities law. The Executive Regulation of the CML in article 218 expressly allows shareholders
to bring private actions when they suffer financial loss because of insider trading. The law does not
require the proof of actual reliance on a defendant’s misstatement or the existence of a fiduciary
relationship; it only requires the showing of causation that one actually suffered losses because of the
insider transaction or being a victim of securities market manipulation.
4. Insider trading jurisdiction
Since insider trading under Egyptian law is a crime, the jurisdiction to adjudicate the violation
of insider trading is a non-administrative court (Economic Courts). 224 The reason behind establishing
Economic Courts as specialized courts in Egyptian judiciary system is to fulfill the requirements of
the corporate sector by expending the dispute resolution period and to guarantee that commercial and
economic cases being heard by a well-informed panel.
The law of the Egyptian Economic Courts (EEC) no. 120 for 2008 in article 4 granted the courts of
first instance and courts of appeals of the EEC -solely- the jurisdiction to hear criminal cases of the
CML. Further, EEC in article 6 granted the courts of first instance of EEC the jurisdiction to litigate
CML monetary disputes on cases over five Egyptian million. 225

For more details about Egyptian Judicial system See, Mohamed Abdel Wahab, Update: An Overview of the Egyptian Legal
System and Legal Research GLOBALEX (2008). “the Egyptian Judiciary is comprised of secular and religious courts,
administrative and non-administrative courts, a Supreme Constitutional Court, penal courts, civil and commercial courts,
personal status and family courts, national security courts, labour courts, military courts, as well as other specialized
courts or circuits”.
225. However, if the defendant in a CML basis dispute is a public administrative authority or the plaintiff pray to revoke
or amend a public authority decree the jurisdiction will be concluded to the State Council Administrative Courts.
224.
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Conclusion
Insider trading in the Egyptian law needs a drafting reform:
As per the insider trading provisions of CML and its Executive Regulation, the Egyptian
legislature has a clear intent to prohibit insider trading. The Egyptian legislature expressly criminalize
insider trading in CML and its Executive Regulation as well as in the Egyptian Criminal Code in article
345 which regulates securities anti-fraud provisions that are applicable upon insider trading offence.
However, the law of insider trading is sometimes misplaced, or its drafting style fails to properly
address the offence of insider trading. This can be clarified as follows:
(1) The language of Article 64 of the CML does not clearly encompass all insider trading presumed
violations. Insider trading laws need to be drafted using generic terms applicable not only to officials
of FRA or any market player whose actions are governed by securities law but also any person who
trades stocks on basis of material nonpublic information. Furthermore, even though Article No. 20
(bis) of the CML prohibits tipping of inside information using the term “any person,” its drafting style
improperly inserted the definition of information materiality in addition to including causation terms
into the text, which might bar charging for insider trading if there are no direct and immediate losses
incurred owing to insider trading.
(2) The Executive Regulation of the CML in Article 319 does not only interpret the legislation of
CML but it also exceeds the scope of interpretation to criminalize insider trading. Since the law of
insider trading in CML is not self-sufficient as a basis to prosecute for the offence of insider trading,
the Executive Regulation of the CML provisions will be required to prove a well-grounded insider
trading case. However, this is not constitutional because the Executive Regulation is issued as per a
Ministerial Decree.
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(3) The Executive Regulation of the CML regulated an uncomprehensive separate prohibition of
insider trading that is only applicable to portfolio management and brokerage companies. Article 244
of section five of chapter six of the Executive Regulation prohibits owners, directors, and employees
of a portfolio management company or brokerage companies from transacting on any securities on the
basis of nonpublic information. The phrasing of Article 244 is redundant because if the CML law of
insider trading is a general and abstract law, then there is no need to reregulate insider trading for
portfolio management and brokerage companies. Yet, Article 244 insider trading law does not
encompass all conceivable insider trading violations of owners, directors, and employees of a portfolio
management company or brokerage companies.

The Need for an Effective Enforcement Mechanism and Adequate Resources
Langevoort once said, “One of the most obviously, and troubling, phenomena in international
securities regulation is that even as the "law on the books" in most developed countries … the
commitment of surveillance and enforcement resources varies considerably.” 226 Egyptian law
ostensibly aims at prohibiting securities fraud. The Egyptian judiciary system does not tolerate
securities fraud and firmly apply securities law. However, there is no effective enforcement mechanism
in place. On the other hand, although the United States insider trading law in some circumstance does
not achieve clarity and completeness, the SEC applies a very effective enforcement mechanism.

The Need for More Resources

226.

Donald C. Langevoort, Cross-Border Insider Trading, 19 Dick. J. Int'l L. 161 (2000).
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In order for the Egyptian FRA and The Egyptian Stock Exchange to undertake their surveillance role
over securities market, they need to adopt the same theory of detection and enforcement mechanism
employed in highly active stock markets. As we explained in Chapter II, the fraud detection
mechanism adopted by the SEC relies on smart technology and computers programs.
The FRA responsibilities over the entire non-banking sector are crucial. In order to undertake these
responsibilities, it requires adequate resources to better guide the Egyptian economic reform. 227
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